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Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the
U.S. Approach to Drugs
Don Stemen*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty years, perhaps no issue has affected the United
States’s criminal justice system as profoundly as has drug policy. Since President Nixon declared drug abuse “America’s public enemy number one,”1
concerns about the manufacture, distribution, and possession of drugs have
remained at the fore of criminal justice policy discussions.2 President Reagan’s subsequent pronouncement of drugs as “an especially vicious virus of
crime” set a course for national drug policy that emphasized enforcement
and punishment over treatment to “win the war on drugs.”3 Throughout the
1980s, increasing public concern about the effects of drug abuse4 further
pressured policymakers at the state and federal levels to adopt new
mandatory sentences and sentence enhancements that increased the
probability and length of prison sentences.5
By the mid-1990s, perceptions of drugs in the United States began to
shift. Policymakers and the public struggled with the continued emphasis on
enforcement and punishment as a response to drugs and began to look to-

* Associate Professor and Chairperson, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology,
Loyola University Chicago. B.A. 1993, University of Illinois, Chicago; M.A. 1997, University
of Illinois, Chicago; Ph.D. 2007, New York University.
1
Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Remarks About an Intensified Program
for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, White House Briefing Room (June 17, 1971), in
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047 [https://per
ma.cc/B8DB-9TYU].
2
See MARC MAUER & RYAN KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE:
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 7–12 (2007).
3
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal
Drug Policy, Camp David (Oct. 2, 1982), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085 [https://perma.cc/F4KT-29PU]. In the same address,
President Reagan renewed the war on drugs metaphor, declaring that the United States was
going to take “down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag . . . [a]nd . . . win the war on
drugs.” Id.
4
See PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, PEW CHARITABLE, 74% SAY DRUG
WAR BEING LOST: INTERDICTION AND INCARCERATION STILL TOP REMEDIES 1 (2001), http://
www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/16.pdf [https://perma.cc/H82F-FVG9]. In the 1990
Pew Research opinion poll, more than thirty percent of U.S. citizens cited drug abuse as the
most important problem facing the nation. Id.
5
See generally DON STEMEN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OF FRAGMENTATION AND
FERMENT: THE IMPACT OF STATE SENTENCING POLICIES ON INCARCERATION RATES, 1975–2002
(2005) (discussing the emergence of structured sentencing, determinate sentencing, and
mandatory sentencing laws across the United States and their effects on state incarceration
rates).
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ward rehabilitation and treatment as alternative approaches.6 Drug courts,
residential substance abuse treatment programs, and alternative sentencing
policies for drug possession expanded across the United States as jurisdictions sought ways to divert drug offenders from prison and to develop
community- and prison-based treatment programs for drug users.7 Yet,
policymakers also expanded the war on drugs in new ways, passing federal
legislation denying financial aid,8 restricting access to public housing,9 and
blocking food stamps10 for people convicted of drug felonies. In the end,
most of the aggressive law enforcement and punitive sentencing policies of
the 1980s remained, continuing to drive drug arrests, convictions, and prison
sentences through the 1990s.11
The twenty-first century has ushered in a marked change in the U.S.
approach to drugs. Policymakers and the public have increasingly recognized that criminal justice responses to the manufacture, distribution, and
possession of drugs have consumed billions of taxpayer dollars,12 resulted in
the incarceration of millions of individuals,13 led to the marginalization of
poor minority communities,14 and done little to decrease the use of drugs.15
Since 2000, states have begun to dismantle much of the apparatus of the war
6
See generally MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 1 (arguing that support for the tough on
crime strategy of addressing drugs declined and support for a treatment approach increased in
the 1990s, resulting in the expansion of drug courts and other diversion strategies).
7
See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG
COURTS (1998) (arguing that, in the 1990s, state and local jurisdictions increasingly found
incarceration did not reduce drug use and crime and that these jurisdictions looked for ways to
divert people from prison and to provide drug abuse treatment to reduce both drug addiction
and drug-related crime).
8
Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012) (stating that a conviction of any offense under any federal or state law involving the possession or sale of a
controlled substance makes an individual ineligible for any federal grant, loan, or work
assistance).
9
The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 13662 (2012)
(supporting a public housing authority’s right to exclude applicants with a history of controlled
substance use and to exercise their discretion to determine which applicants were possible
risks to the safety of the community); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 501, 104 Stat. 4079 (imposing a mandatory three-year ban on the
readmission of tenants evicted for drug-related criminal activity); Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l), (q) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (strengthening
eviction rules and allowing housing authorities access to housing applicants’ criminal records).
10
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 814(3), 110 Stat. 2105, 2313–14 (since repealed) (establishing that a state or federal felony drug conviction makes an individual ineligible for federal welfare benefits).
11
See generally MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 3–4, 7 (showing that arrests for drug
offenses increased and that the length of prison sentences for drug offenses increased through
the 1990s).
12
The Drug Policy Alliance estimates the United States spends over fifty-one billion dollars annually on the war on drugs. Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://www
.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics [https://perma.cc/PK6N-QJCR].
13
MAUER & KING, supra note 2.
14
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration and the war on drugs
targeted poor, young, black men and that this had led to the legal marginalization of this
population).
15
ROBERT J. MACCOUN, DRUG WAR HERESIES 15–16 (2001).
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on drugs—reclassifying and reducing sentences for drug offenses, repealing
mandatory sentencing policies, creating mandatory probation programs, increasing eligibility and opportunities for drug courts and deferred prosecution programs, and legalizing medical and recreational use of marijuana.16
The federal response under Presidents Bush and Obama has been more
incremental, but still significant. Despite linking drug use to aiding the financing of terrorism in 2001,17 President Bush pushed for increased funding
for substance abuse treatment18 and advocated passage of the Second Chance
Act, which assists people returning from prison.19 President Obama declared
the war on drugs an “utter failure”20 before taking office and, once in office,
ushered in several notable changes in federal approaches to drugs. These
included a push to end the crack cocaine/powder cocaine sentence disparity,21 the reduction of sentences for all drug offenses under the federal sentencing guidelines,22 and the commutation of sentences for more than one
thousand drug offenders in federal prison.23 Although some argue that President Obama did too little during much of his administration to undo federal

16
RAM SUBRAMANIAN & REBECKA MORENO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
STATE-LEVEL DRUG LAW REFORM, 2009–2013 5 (2014); RAM SUBRAMANIAN & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PLAYBOOK FOR CHANGE? STATES RECONSIDER MANDATORY
SENTENCES 5, 12 (2014).
17
Bush: War on Drugs Aids War on Terror, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2001, 2:47 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-war-on-drugs-aids-war-on-terror/ [https://perma.cc/WWS3HUSK] (reporting that President Bush stated, “If you quit drugs, you join the fight against
terrorism . . .” and “Drug abuse threatens everything, everything that is best about our country.
It breaks the bond between parent and child. It turns productive citizens into addicts. It transforms schools into places of violence and chaos. It makes playgrounds into crime scenes. It
supports gangs at home. And abroad, it’s important for Americans to know that trafficking of
drugs finances the world of terror, sustaining terrorists.”).
18
U.S. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY,
2004 6 (2004).
19
Second Chance Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, 42
U.S.C. § 17501 (2012) (supporting state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations to develop and implement programs to reduce recidivism and improve outcomes for
people returning from state and federal prisons, local jails, and juvenile facilities).
20
Bernd Debusmann, Obama and the Failed War on Drugs, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012,
1:54PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-debusmann-drugs-idUSBRE83F0ZR2012
0416 [https://perma.cc/VM7H-PEL8].
21
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (2012)).
22
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE 2014 REDUCTION OF DRUG SENTENCES (2015).
23
Sarah Smith, Obama Picks Up the Pace on Commutations, But Pardon Changes Still in
Limbo, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 5, 2017, 11:54AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/obamapicks-up-the-pace-on-commutations-but-pardon-changes-still-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/
9CVR-GXRP] (noting that President Obama had granted clemency to 1,176 individuals). The
Justice Department also adopted prosecution policies declining in most cases to use federal law
to prosecute state-licensed growers and retailers of marijuana, see Memorandum from James
M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum], and declining to charge low-level, non-violent drug offenders with offenses carrying
mandatory minimum sentences, see Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to all U.S.
Att’ys and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div., (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Holder
Memorandum].

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-2\HLP206.txt

378

unknown

Seq: 4

Harvard Law & Policy Review

30-JUN-17

14:41

[Vol. 11

drug control policies,24 he significantly changed the rhetoric surrounding
drugs (and crime generally) from a criminal justice perspective to a treatment perspective.25 President Obama also drew attention to the disproportionate impact of the war on drugs on African American communities.26
Although African Americans account for just thirteen percent of the U.S.
population27 and just fifteen percent of drug users,28 they account for twentyseven percent of individuals arrested for a drug offense29 and roughly thirtyfive percent of state and federal inmates incarcerated for a drug offense.30
24
See, e.g., A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (Feb. 23, 2017, 7:46
PM), http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0,
[https://perma.cc/E3RZ-V7UC] (arguing that President Obama moved drug reform slowly towards sensible policies); Tim Dickinson, Why America Can’t Quit the Drug War, ROLLING
STONE (Feb. 18, 2017, 1:23 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-americacant-quit-the-drug-war-20160505 [https://perma.cc/8N4V-6WWV] (claiming that the fundamental architecture of the war on drugs remained more-or-less unchanged under President
Obama).
25
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks During a Panel Discussion at
the National Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Summit in Atlanta, Georgia (Mar. 29, 2016),
in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
115136 [https://perma.cc/XZ9W-63JE] (President Obama noted that “[W]e have viewed the
problem of drug abuse generally in our society through the lens of the criminal justice system. . . . [T]he only way that we reduce demand is if we’re providing treatment and thinking
about this as a public health problem, and not just a criminal problem.”).
26
Id. (President Obama noted, “Part of what has made it previously difficult to emphasize
treatment over the criminal justice system has to do with the fact that the populations affected
in the past were viewed as, or stereotypically identified as poor, minority, and as a consequence, the thinking was it is often a character flaw in those individuals who live in those
communities, and it’s not our problem they’re just being locked up.”).
27
U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
table/PST045216/00 [ https://perma.cc/6C9H-GGLX] (showing the Black or African American population at 13.3% of the U.S. population as of 2015).
28
CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY, RESULTS FROM THE 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES (2014) [hearinafter NATIONAL
SURVEY FINDINGS: 2014, TABLES] , Table 1-19b, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/NSDUH-DetTabs2014/NSDUH-DetTabs2014.htm#tab1-19b [https://perma.cc/2TRE-YX
YS]. The figures used in the Samhsa Table 1-19b were combined with the population estimates from the Census Bureau to calculate the total number of new drug users in 2014 and the
total number of Black or African American drug users in 2014. Based on Census Bureau
estimates, the 2015 U.S. population is estimated at 321,418,820 individuals and 13.3% of the
population, or 42,748,703 individuals, is Black or African American. According to Samhsa,
16.7% of the U.S. population, or 53,676,942 individuals, used illicit drugs in 2014 and 19.5%
of Black or African American individuals, or 8,335,997 individuals, used illicit drugs in 2014.
Thus, Black or African American individuals represent roughly 15% of U.S. drug users in
2014 (8,335,997/53,676,942).
29
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2015, Table 43A https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/
GZ5C-44QE] (noting twenty-seven percent of those arrested for “Drug Abuse Violations” in
2015 were Black or African American.).
30
E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRISONERS IN 2015, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 30–31 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GHR2-AFMK]. The total numbers of individuals incarcerated in state prisons for a drug offense and the total number of Black individuals incarcerated in state prisons for a drug offense
were taken from Appendix Table 5. The total numbers of individuals incarcerated in federal
prisons for a drug offense and the total number of Black individuals incarcerated in federal
prisons for a drug offense were taken from Appendix Table 6. These were combined to deter-
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On the cusp of the third decade of the twenty-first century, the United
States is poised to significantly change its approach to drug offenses at both
the state and federal levels. Some argue that there is an opportunity to adopt
a medical approach to substance abuse and leave behind the criminalization
approach that dominated U.S. policy through the latter half of the twentieth
century.31 The recent shifts in both policy and public perception around
drugs also coincide with a new public health problem. Over thirty-three
thousand opioid-related fatal overdoses occurred in the United States in
2015,32 and opioid addiction has ushered in new concerns about drug abuse
and state and federal approaches to drug addiction.33 While this new wave of
drug abuse and interdiction has changed both the perception of the typical
drug offender and concerns about drugs, it remains unclear how this will
affect the long-term approach to drugs in the United States. A look at the
recent past indicates that the escalation of the war on drugs happened
quickly; whether moving beyond the war on drugs can occur as rapidly remains an unanswered question.
This article examines recent changes to state and federal drug sentencing laws. Part I discusses the context of the war on drugs, considering substance use patterns and sentencing policies in the 1970s that set the stage for
the more punitive approaches to drug offenses in the 1980s and 1990s. Part
II then analyzes the primary sentencing policies enacted as part of the war on
drugs. Although it is often impossible to tie a specific policy directly to an
increase or decrease in arrests or prison populations, documenting the content, scope, and volume of sentencing laws provides a context for understanding the extent to which these policies were designed to increase the use
of prison. Part III outlines recent changes to state and federal sentencing
laws that seek to dismantle the apparatus of the war on drugs. This part
details changes to sentencing laws enacted since the 2000s, focusing specifically on alternatives to traditional prosecution and incarceration.
Part IV then considers the short and potential long-term impact of these
recent changes, particularly given the state-level movement of marijuana legalization and the rise in opioid abuse. At the state level, these trends are
likely to continue to drive changes in drug laws, as the public and policymakers either see drug use as acceptable (in the case of marijuana or other
low-level drugs) or see drug abuse as a problem in need of treatment rather
than criminalization; changes in state-level drug laws also will likely continue as states increasingly target changes to low-level drug offenses as nonmine the percentage of all individuals incarcerated for a drug offense in the United States who
are Black.
31
Arthur J. Lurigio et al., A Century of Losing Battles: The Costly and Ill-Advised War on
Drugs in the United States, 6(2) JUST. SYS. J. 1, at 5 (2009).
32
Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United
States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445 (2016), https://www.cdc
.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm655051e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC5P-NY88].
33
Tamara M. Haegerich et al., What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the Impact of State
Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 34 (2014).
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controversial means of achieving long-term reductions in prison populations
and corrections expenditures.34 At the federal level, long-term impacts are
less clear. Although the Obama administration oversaw several changes to
federal drug laws, the majority of federal mandatory sentences remain
largely intact. Moreover, many reforms initiated under President Obama—
increased federal spending on drug treatment rather than enforcement,35 the
Justice Department’s charging policies regarding marijuana offenses and
low-level drug offenses,36 the commutation of drug sentences—were discretionary policies of the administration and not changes in law. As such, a new
administration with a renewed law and order focus and a perception of inner-city neighborhoods as plagued by drugs and violence can easily adopt
new policies that either continue or intensify the war on drugs.37
I. BEFORE

THE

WAR: SETTING

THE

STAGE

FOR THE

WAR

ON

DRUGS

Government efforts to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and possession of drugs are not a new phenomenon in the United States.38 In the
early twentieth century, the federal government began regulating drug production and distribution through the Food and Drug Act of 190639 and attaching criminal penalties to the unauthorized production and distribution of
narcotics through the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914.40 The Narcotic
34
See e.g., ILL. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE & SENTENCING REFORM, FINAL
REPORT, PARTS I AND II 9 (2016) (noting that low-level offenders often have high levels of
recidivism).
35
Sophie Novak & Patrick Reis, Here’s How Obama Plans to Spend $25 Billion on the
War on Drugs, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/
03/heres-how-obama-plans-to-spend-25-billion-on-the-war-on-drugs/453108/, [https://perma
.cc/2CCZ-M299].
36
See Cole Memorandum, supra note 23 (announcing policy of declining in most cases to
use federal law to prosecute state-licensed growers and retailers of marijuana); Holder Memorandum, supra note 23 (announcing policy of declining to charge low-level, non-violent drug
offenders with offenses carrying mandatory minimum sentences).
37
See, e.g., Timothy Williams & Richard A. Oppel, Police Chiefs Say Trump’s Law Enforcement Priorities Are Out of Step, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/12/us/police-chiefs-trump-law-enforcement-priorities.html [https://nyti.ms/
2kAKYA3] (noting that police chiefs and prosecutors see the new administration as “out of
step with evidence that public safety depends on building trust, increasing mental health and
drug addiction treatment, and using alternatives to prosecution and incarceration”).
38
For historical accounts of federal and state policies regulating controlled substances,
see, e.g., LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS (2014); The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, FDA.GOV (June 18, 2009), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
Origin/ucm054819.htm [https://perma.cc/4GL8-TMHV]; Lurigio et al., supra note 31. See
generally JOHN C. MCWILLIAMS, THE PROTECTORS: HARRY J. ANSLINGER AND THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, 1930–1962, (1990) (describing the initial creation of federal drug
policy and the Bureau of Narcotics); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF
NARCOTIC CONTROL (1999) (describing the political and economic factors underlying initial
prohibitions against narcotics).
39
Food and Drug Acts (Pure Food and Drugs Act) of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat.
768 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
40
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat 785.
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Drug Import and Export Act of 1922 criminalized the possession of illegally
obtained narcotics,41 the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 sought to extend narcotics prohibitions to the distribution and possession of marijuana,42 and the
creation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930 increased the federal
presence in controlling the manufacture and distribution of drugs.43 The passage of the Boggs Act in 195144 and the Narcotics Control Act in 195645
increased the penalties for drug offenses creating mandatory sentences for
some offenses and making sale of heroin to minors a capital offense.46 Statelevel efforts at drug control during this time changed in similar ways, with
states seeking increased enforcement, control, and punishment of drugrelated activity through the 1960s.47
Despite the scope and nature of these approaches, scholars have not
generally believed that drug policies through the late 1960s ushered in the
“war on drugs.” Rather, rising rates of drug use and crime, increasing
politicization of crime, decreasing confidence in rehabilitation, and calls to
limit judicial and parole board discretion during the late-1970s and 1980s
put drugs in a new context of crime control and shifted criminal justice responses to all drug and non-drug crimes. These factors set the stage for the
adoption of more aggressive federal and state approaches to drug control and
the unprecedented growth in arrests and prison sentences for drug offense in
the 1980s and 1990s.
A. Patterns of Drug Use and Crime
The war on drugs occurred in the context of rising drug use and rising
crime rates. During the early-1970s, first-time marijuana use was at historic
levels in the United States, with roughly 3.5 million individuals reporting
first-time marijuana use annually between 1973 and 1975 (Figure 1).48 While
first-time marijuana use declined through the remainder of the 1970s, the
41
Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 67-227, 42 Stat. 596 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
42
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C).
43
MCWILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 46.
44
The Boggs Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767.
45
The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 570.
46
MUSTO, supra note 38, at 231, 242. The Drug Abuse Control Act of 1965 also created
new requirements for prescription and counterfeit drugs and President Johnson in 1968 consolidated the investigation and enforcement of all federal drug offenses within the Department of
Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. See Lurigio et al., supra note 31, at 9.
47
See Lurigio et al., supra note 31.
48
CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY, RESULTS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2002), at 233–34 (Tables H.35 and H.36 present the number of
people who first used marijuana or cocaine between 1965 and 2001); number of new users for
2002 through 2013 are taken from annual reports detailing each subsequent National Survey
on Drug Use and Health. See, e.g., CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY,
RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH (2014) [hereinafter
NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2014], at 61–62.
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number of people reporting first-time cocaine use continued to rise, peaking
at over 1.1 million individuals in 1980, up from just 258,000 individuals in
1970.49 First-time use of marijuana and cocaine continued to decline through
the late 1980s, before rising again the 1990s.50

Number of people trying drug for
the first time in past year

FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF PEOPLE INITIATING DRUG USE FOR FIRST TIME
PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS, BY DRUG TYPE, 1970–2013

IN

4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0

Marijuana

Cocaine

During the early 1970s, crime rates in the United States were also in the
second decade of a several decades-long upward trend (Figure 2).51 Between
1960 and 1970, the property crime rate increased 110%, and the violent
crime rate increased 125%; between 1970 and 1980, these rates increased an
additional 48% and 64%, respectively.52 Violent crime rates continued to rise
through the 1980s, finally peaking in 1991 and resulting in a total increase of
370% between 1960 and 1991.53

49

NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2002, supra note 48.
Id.
51
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
MULTIPLE YEARS, http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm
[https://perma.cc/2DF5-UXJF].
52
Id.
53
Id.
50
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FIGURE 2. U.S. VIOLENT CRIME RATE AND PROPERTY CRIME RATE,
1960–2014

Violent crime rate

During this same period, public concerns about crime were changing.
Throughout most of the 1960s, crime and violence were not important issues
for citizens; between 1960 and 1966, an average of 1.6% of Americans responding to the Gallup MIP poll identified crime/violence as the most important issue facing the country (Figure 3).54 Between 1967 and 1973,
however, an average of over fourteen percent of Americans viewed crime/
violence as the most important issue facing the country.55 The number of
Americans holding this view declined through the 1980s—hovering around
an average of five percent—before rising dramatically in the 1990s; between
1994 and 2000, an average of over twenty-five percent of Americans viewed
crime/violence as the most important issue facing the country.56

54
COMPARATIVE AGENDAS PROJECT, http://www.comparativeagendas.net/tool [https://per
ma.cc/EDU4-GGY9].
55
Id.
56
Id.
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS STATING CRIME/VIOLENCE IS
“M OST IMPORTANT PROBLEM” FACING THE COUNTRY,
1970-2014
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Thus, the war on drugs was initiated at a time when the level of drug
use was relatively high, crime was rising dramatically, and the public (at
times) was very concerned about crime. At the same time, researchers were
documenting the nexus between drugs and crime, attributing much of the
rise in violent crime to drug use.57 But rising crime and drug use rates and
increasing public concern about crime did not alone change policy responses
to drugs; rather, these changes coincided with the increasing politicization of
crime.58
B. The Politicization of Crime
As crime rates increased, crime and crime control became an integral
part of American politics.59 Since the late 1960s, crime control has routinely
been the subject of political debate and a central campaign issue, often used
strategically by both liberal and conservative politicians to gain wider elec57
See, e.g., Paul J. Goldstein, The Drug/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 39 J. DRUG ISSUES 493, 493 (1985) (focusing on the connection between violent crime
and drug use in the 1980s by documenting that approximately thirty-one percent of homicides
committed by individuals under age thirty in Philadelphia were attributed to illicit drug use);
Paul J. Goldstein et al., Drug-Related Homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988, 38 CRIME &
DELINQ. 459, 460 (1992).
58
See generally KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997).
59
See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 91–94 (2009).
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toral support.60 This politicization of crime has led politicians to campaign
on “law and order” platforms and to adopt policies directed at increased law
enforcement and punitive sentencing.61
The war on drugs began at a time when politicians realized the political
power of crime control platforms and policies, and it continued as that political tool gained in power.62 Some argue that by the end of the twentieth century, crime and crime control were central to the exercise of authority in the
United States at all levels of government63 and that the control of drugs was
central to that authority.64 Although drug use could have been framed in
terms of a medical issue or treatment issue rather than a crime issue, the
power of crime as a political and governing tool in the late twentieth century
functioned to frame it simply as a crime issue.65 During this time, the criminal justice system also shifted its focus to view punishment, deterrence, and
incapacitation, rather than rehabilitation, as the dominant goal of sentencing
and corrections.66
C. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal
Throughout much of the twentieth century, sentencing and corrections
in the United States maintained a philosophical goal of rehabilitation.67
Policymakers understood the goal of sentencing and corrections as helping
offenders address the underlying causes of their criminal behavior and to
change that behavior through drug treatment, counseling, or skills development.68 However, during the early 1970s, a review of research on the effectiveness of correctional treatment programs questioned the effectiveness of
this rehabilitative approach.69 Robert Martinson’s 1974 article, “What
Works,” contended that rehabilitation and treatment, the justifications under-

60
See, e.g., id.; BECKETT, supra note 58, at 23–25. See generally KATHERINE BECKETT &
THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2004)
(tracing the rise of the “tough on crime” movement from Republican’s political strategy of
making crime a national issue in the early 1970s to the Democrat’s use of such approaches in
the 1990s to win national elections).
61
See id.
62
See BECKETT, supra note 58, at 55–61.
63
See SIMON, supra note 59, at 71–72 (arguing that politicians use crime not only to gain
political power, but to promote government policies and legitimize government action).
64
See id. at 262–63.
65
See id. at 240–44.
66
Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 765 (1989).
67
See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001) (arguing that through much of the twentieth century penal
policy was focused on the philosophical goal of rehabilitation; however, in the latter part of the
twentieth century penal policy became increasingly focused on control through incapacitation
and deterrence).
68
Id.
69
See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. REFORM 22 (1974).
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lying sentencing and corrections policies up to that point in the twentieth
century, had failed to produce any desirable changes in individuals.70
After Martinson’s publication, many policymakers concluded that
“nothing works” in rehabilitation.71 Although Martinson revised his conclusions somewhat,72 the narrative that treatment was ineffective as a crime
control mechanism took hold and policymakers called for a system that
shifted away from treatment and rehabilitation and toward one that emphasized personal responsibility as well as punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation as correctional goals.73 With this shift came an increase in sentence
lengths, reaffirmation of the death penalty, an expansion of criminal offenses, and a change in the stated purposes of corrections.74 The decline in
rehabilitation as a goal led to changes in sentencing policies as well, shifting
focus from individualized sentences to certainty and uniformity of punishment through mandatory minimums.75
D. The Shift to Structure and Determinacy in Sentencing
Through the mid-1970s, sentencing and corrections policy in all fifty
states and the federal government consisted of an unstructured, indeterminate sentencing model. Judges exercised broad discretion over the disposition and duration of imposed sentences, and parole boards maintained
equally broad authority over the duration of sentences served through discretionary parole release.76 The discretionary characteristic of the unstructured,
indeterminate model was based on the idea that individualization should be
the goal of sanctioning and could be achieved by tailoring both the sentence
imposed and the time served in prison to the unique characteristics of the
offender.77
The unstructured, indeterminate system and its focus on individualization, however, were attacked in the mid-1970s. Liberal reformers argued that
the potential for class and racial discrimination existed in the broad discre70

Id.
See, e.g., Francis Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 1,
323–30 (2013).
72
See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Prison
Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252 (1979).
73
See GARLAND, supra note 67, at 64.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Don Stemen & Andres Rengifo, Charting the Evolution of Structure and Determinacy
in State Sentencing and Corrections Policies, 1970–2010, 14 JUS. RES. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2012)
(noting that legislation generally set wide statutory sentence ranges for offenses, permitting
judges equally wide latitude to impose a sentence length anywhere within that range, based on
their evaluation of the offense and the offender; also noting that legislation provided few criteria on which parole boards were to base release decisions and, in turn, parole boards had wide
discretion to release offenders at any time between some minimal time served requirement and
the statutory maximum sentence for the offense); see also KEVIN REITZ, The Disassembly and
Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING IN THE WESTERN WORLD 226–27
(Richard Frase & Michael Tony eds., 2001).
77
See GARLAND, supra note 67.
71
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tion available to judges and parole boards.78 Conservative reformers argued
that such discretion led to lenient sentences from judges and undue early
release by parole boards.79 Both liberal and conservative reformers supported
systems that limited or removed the discretion of judges and parole boards to
ensure consistency in punishment.80 The result was the adoption by several
states and the federal government of “structured sentencing” through the
creation of presumptive sentences or sentencing guidelines that constricted
sentence dispositions and lengths available to judges.81 Several states and the
federal government also adopted “determinate sentencing,” in which discretionary release by a parole board was abolished.82 The objective was to control decision-making at sentencing or at release from prison or both, with the
goal of fitting punishments to crimes and abolishing the variability of sentencing and release decisions.83
California was the first state to adopt presumptive sentences in 1977,
and Minnesota was the first state to adopt sentencing guidelines in 1980.84
Between 1977 and 2000, twenty-eight states and the federal government enacted some form of structured sentencing.85 Maine was the first state to abolish discretionary parole release in 1976, and between 1976 and 2000 a total
of nineteen states and the federal government abolished discretionary parole
release.86
The decline of rehabilitation as a goal coincided with a change in sentencing philosophy—a move away from individualized sentencing toward a
sentencing scheme based on aggregate sentencing.87 Political conservatives,
however, also realized the creation of new mandatory sentencing laws could

78

See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. WORKING PARTY, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A RECRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 124–25; 143–44 (1976); MARVIN FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 69–102 (1972); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING
MATTERS 54–58 (1996) (documenting the existence of unwarranted racial and gender disparities in sentences and time served under the unstructured/indeterminate system); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT 98–102 (1976).
79
See, e.g., PAMELA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND THE REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 48–50 (1991); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
189–94 (1975).
80
See GRISET, supra note 79, at 31–32.
81
Stemen & Rengifo, supra note 76, at 6–12 (noting that structured sentencing seeks to
narrow or guide judicial discretion in determining the length of an imposed prison term by
identifying the “typical” case and providing a recommended sentence or prison term for such
a typical case within the wider statutory sentence range).
82
Id. at 12–15 (noting that determinate sentencing is about controlling release decisions
and the length of time served, primarily through the abolition of discretionary parole release as
a mechanism for releasing offenders from prison).
83
See, e.g., SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (1985); REITZ, supra note 76, at
223–24.
84
Stemen & Rengifo, supra note 76, at 8–10.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 13.
87
See GARLAND, supra note 67, at 102–03.
PORT ON
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achieve these goals while also increasing the use of incarceration, sentence
severity, and offender accountability.88
E. The Re-emergence of Mandatory Sentencing Laws
While the adoption of structured and determinate sentencing changed
sentencing practices in several states and the federal government, an increase
in the adoption and use of mandatory sentencing laws and sentence enhancement laws affected all states and the federal government.89 Neither policy is
new to state and federal sentencing and corrections systems.90 What is new,
however, is the resurgence and prevalence of such laws since the 1970s.91
During the early twentieth century, many states and the federal government adopted mandatory sentencing and sentence enhancement laws, directed at specific offenses (e.g., murder and rape) or specific offenders (e.g.,
repeat offenders), with the goals of deterring and incapacitating offenders.92
Through the 1950s and 1960s, states and the federal government repealed
most mandatory sentencing policies, driven primarily by evidence that
mandatory sentencing laws either did not work to reduce crime or were actively circumvented by practitioners.93 By 1970, the federal government had
repealed nearly all mandatory sentencing laws for drug offenses.94
Although it conflicted with nearly fifty years of research and experience on the effectiveness of mandatory sentencing laws, beginning in the
mid-1970s, every state began adopting mandatory sentencing laws and sentence enhancement laws.95 The common goals underlying the adoption of
structured and determinate sentencing—the desires to fit punishments to
crimes and to abolish the variability of sentencing and release decisions—
were combined with the goal of increasing the use of incarceration.96 Conservative critics contended that mandatory sentences were necessary to ensure the imposition of harsher penalties for particular offenses that posed
88

See TONRY, supra note 78, at 134–35.
See, e.g., STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 26; TONRY, supra note 78, at 146 (stating that
“[d]espite earlier generations’ understanding of why mandatory penalties are unsound policy,
mandatory sentencing laws since 1975 have been America’s most popular sentencing innovation.” Mandatory sentencing laws require judges to impose an incarcerative sentence for a
particular offense; sentence enhancement laws increase the statutory sentence range available
for a particular offense when certain “triggering” factors are present.).
90
See generally TONRY, supra note 78, at 134–64.
91
Id.
92
See Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 75 (2009) [hereinafter Mandatory
Penalties].
93
Id. at 65–66, 74.
94
Id. at 74.
95
Id. at 75 (“Between 1975 and 1996, mandatory minimums were America’s most frequently enacted sentencing law changes. By 1983, 49 of the 50 states (Wisconsin was the
holdout) had adopted mandatory sentencing laws for offenses other than murder or drunk
driving.”).
96
Id. at 101–03 (discussing legislative goal of “getting tough” on crime and increasing
incarceration rates).
89
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extreme threats to public safety.97 Given rising crime rates and the increased
recognition of the drugs/crime nexus during this period, drug offenses and
specific triggering events surrounding drug offenses (e.g., proximity to a
school, offenses involving a minor, offenses involving gang activity) were
singled out for increasingly harsh mandatory sentences.98
F. Conclusion
Overall, rising drug use and crime rates, the politicization of crime, the
decline of rehabilitation, the shift to structured and determinate sentencing,
and the re-embrace of mandatory sentencing set the stage for a new phase in
the war on drugs. From the 1970s through the 1990s, states and the federal
government adopted sentencing and corrections policies that were increasingly harsh for drug offenses, often limiting or eliminating the sentencing
discretion of judges and the release discretion of parole boards. In turn, jurisdictions increased enforcement of drug laws and expanded aggressive law
enforcement activities, often with the financial support and direction of the
federal government. The following part details some of the policies adopted
during the heart of the war on drugs and the effects of those policies on
arrests and prison sentences in the United States.
II. STAGING

THE

WAR: SENTENCING POLICIES

AND THE

WAR

ON

DRUGS

Although the declaration of the war on drugs was initially made at the
federal level, that war has been fought primarily at the state level. In 2014,
for example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested
30,035 individuals for federal drug offenses99 while state and local law enforcement arrested 1,561,231 individuals for drug offenses.100 Although the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)101 places drug control under federal jurisdiction, all states have separate statutory frameworks under which
they individually enforce state drug laws. As detailed below, both the federal
government and the individual states fundamentally changed their approaches to drug offenses under the war on drugs.

97

Id. at 69; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 201–04 (1975).
See Mandatory Penalties, supra note 92, at 77.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DEA DOMESTIC ARRESTS (https://
www.dea.gov/resource-center/statistics.shtml#arrests) [https://perma.cc/MT2N-BGMH].
100
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
2014 (https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main)
[https://perma.cc/UB4M-9MGQ].
101
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
98
99
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A. Federal Responses to the War on Drugs
In the 1970s, federal efforts in the war on drugs focused primarily on
consolidating federal drug policies and improving enforcement of existing
laws. Passed in 1970, the CSA placed the control of certain drugs under
federal jurisdiction and established the statutory framework for the federal
regulation of the production, distribution, and possession of controlled substances, including the classification of drugs into five schedules of controlled
substances.102 In 1973, the DEA was created within the Department of Justice to coordinate federal efforts at enforcing the CSA and federal drug
laws.103 These efforts focused primarily on increasing federal interdiction efforts, as evidenced by the expansion of the size and power of the DEA;
indeed, in 1973, the DEA began with 1,470 agents and an annual budget of
$74.9 million; by 1980, these numbers grew to 1,941 agents and an annual
budget of $206.6 million.104
It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the federal government significantly changed the sentencing framework for drug offenses. Through the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,105 the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of
1986106 and 1988,107 and the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act
of 1996,108 the federal government increased penalties and limited judicial
discretion in setting sentences for drug offenses. The cumulative effect of
these laws marked an increase in the overall severity of sentences and an
increase in the prevalence of mandatory sentences for drug offenses at the
federal level.
The sentencing provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984 profoundly altered federal sentencing practices and procedures for all
federal crimes. The most notable sentencing reforms enacted by the Act included writing into law new goals of federal criminal sentencing, establishing the U.S. Sentencing Commission with the authority to set mandatory
sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses, and abolishing discretionary
release from prison.109 The Act increased maximum sentences available for
offenses involving Schedule I and II controlled substances and doubled the
102

Id.
Exec. Order No. 11727, 3 C.F.R. 785 (1971-1975); SEN. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 2 OF 1973, ESTABLISHING A DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 93-469, at 5–6 (1973).
104
U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: 1970–
1975, http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1970-1975.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST36-G4X
D]; U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: 1975–1980,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1970-1975.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9S3X-XG8J].
105
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (Title V of the Controlled Substances Penalties
Amendments Act of 1984 altered penalties for drug offenses).
106
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
107
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
108
Pub. L. No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
109
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C).
103
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sentences available for repeat drug offenses.110 The act also created two new
offenses: cultivating controlled substances on federal land, which included a
mandatory fine of five hundred thousand dollars, and distributing a controlled substance within one thousand feet of an elementary or secondary
school, which doubled penalties for the underlying offense.111
Once the sentencing guidelines created under the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act took effect, the mandatory sentences created under the
1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act were incorporated into the guideline recommendations.112 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created a series of mandatory
sentences for drug offenses,113 ranging from distribution of controlled substance to a person under twenty-one years of age or near a school
(mandatory minimum of one year)114 to acting as the “kingpin” of a continuing criminal enterprise (mandatory life imprisonment).115 The Act also created two tiers of mandatory sentences for drug trafficking offenses116 based
on the quantity and type of drug involved.117 For the largest quantities of
drugs (e.g., one kilogram heroin), these sentences included a ten-year
mandatory minimum for a first offense and a twenty-year mandatory minimum for a second offense.118 For trafficking offenses involving smaller
quantities of drugs (e.g., one-hundred grams heroin), these included a fiveyear mandatory minimum for a first offense and a ten-year mandatory minimum for second and subsequent offenses.119 The 1986 Act also differentiated
“cocaine base” (crack) from powder cocaine and created the 100:1 disparity
in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine.120 Under the Act, a person convicted of trafficking just five grams of crack cocaine received the same fiveyear mandatory sentence as a person convicted of trafficking five hundred
grams of powder cocaine; similarly, a person convicted of trafficking just
fifty grams of crack cocaine received the same ten-year mandatory sentence
as a person convicted of trafficking five thousand grams of powder
cocaine.121

110

Id.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
113
For a comprehensive list of federal mandatory minimum sentences and the timing of
their enactment dates, see FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Chart-All-Fed-MMs-11.10.15-NW
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MFA-D5QP].
114
21 U.S.C. § 859 (2012) (imposing penalties for sales to persons under twenty-one
years of age); 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2012) (imposing penalties for distribution in proximity to
schools); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.2 (2016).
115
21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (2012); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.5 (2016).
116
Drug trafficking offenses include the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012).
117
Pub. L. No. 99-570, §1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. Congress later reduced the cocaine disparity from 100:1 to 18:1 through the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat 2372.
111
112
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The Anti-Drug Abuse Act sought to coordinate federal agencies’ efforts
to reduce drug supply and demand by establishing the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Director of National Drug Control
Policy (commonly referred to as the “drug czar”).122 The Act also created
new mandatory minimums for attempts or conspiracies to commit drug offenses, a mandatory life sentence for trafficking the largest quantities of
drugs (e.g., one kilogram heroin), and a mandatory ten-year sentence for
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.123 The Act also created a fiveyear mandatory minimum for first-time simple possession of five grams of
crack cocaine, the only first-time simple possession drug offense requiring a
mandatory prison sentence.124
Through the 1990s, federal drug legislation focused primarily on synthetic drugs.125 Although methamphetamine was included as a Schedule II
drug under the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, methamphetamine abuse
did not arise until the late-1980s and early-1990s as the popularity of cocaine decreased.126 Federal efforts were directed largely at reducing the manufacture of methamphetamine, since it could be produced in labs in homes
with legally purchased items including pseudoephedrine.127 These included
the creation of enhanced penalties for manufacturing and trafficking
methamphetamine under the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act
of 1996.128 Similar changes were made following the re-emergence of
MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine or ecstasy) in the late
1990s at raves and house parties, increasing penalties for individuals who
maintain drug-involved premises.129 The result was a series of new twentyyear mandatory sentence for trafficking flunitrazepam, GHB, or other synthetic drugs that result in serious bodily injury.130
Federal sentencing provisions for drug offenses remained largely the
same through the 2000s. The result has been a federal sentencing scheme
consisting of draconian drug sentences disproportionate to the underlying
offenses and that severely limits judges’ ability to deviate from the sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences required under the law. Despite several changes to federal law and policy described below, this structure
remains largely intact today, limiting reformers’ ability to make significant
changes without large-scale dismantling of mandatory sentencing laws.

122

Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012).
125
SACCO, supra note 38, at 11.
126
CHARLES F. LEVINTHAL, DRUGS, SOCIETY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3RD ED. 182 (2012).
127
SACCO, supra note 38, at 11.
128
Pub. L. No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
129
Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).
130
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2D1.1 (2016).
123
124
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B. State Responses to the War on Drugs
While tracking the federal approach to the war on drugs is fairly simple,
tracking all of the varied state-level policies is more difficult. However,
some general patterns are discernible. Between 1970 and 2000, most states
introduced greater complexity into drug laws by grading drug offenses by
the type and quantity of drug involved.131 They also increased penalties for
drug offenses by increasing statutory sentence ranges, creating sentence enhancements, and enacting mandatory sentences.132
Since the 1970s, state approaches to setting penalties for drug law violations became increasingly complex. In 1975, most states had broadly written criminal statutes for drug manufacture, sale, and possession offenses that
did not differentiate between offenses based on quantity.133 For example, in
1975, forty-five states provided only one sentence range for sale of any
quantity of cocaine, with only five states increasing penalties for the sale of
larger quantities.134 In the 1980s, an increasing number of states began creating hierarchical schemes for sanctioning drug offenses based on the quantity
of drug involved, with longer sentence ranges for both large and small quantities of drugs.135 By 2000, a total of thirty-eight states had created such
quantity thresholds.136 In addition, states initially created these multiple
quantity thresholds for only a limited number of substances—generally, just
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.137 However, beginning in the late-1980s, two
additional substances were increasingly differentiated by quantity—crack
cocaine and methamphetamine.138 One consequence of this was the creation
of the same crack/powder cocaine sentence disparity existing in the federal
system; by 2000, ten states had created quantity thresholds for the sale of
crack cocaine that differed from those for powder cocaine.139
131
See generally STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 22–24 (describing changes in quantity
thresholds).
132
Id. at 95–100 (describing the types and number of sentencing enhancements across the
states).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 22. For example, New York set three different statutory sentence ranges for sale
of the following quantities of cocaine: 0 to 1/8 ounce, 1/8 ounce to 1 ounce, and more than 1
ounce. Generally, increased quantity thresholds were created only for sale and manufacturing
offenses and were directed primarily at cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, substances that represented the most used and trafficked drugs at the time. Analysis conducted by author using data
collected as part of the National Institute of Justice project, Of Fragmentation and Ferment
(project #2002-IJ-CX-0027). Data available at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data
(ICPSR 4456) at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4456 [https://perma
.cc/YZ8X-LH2K].
135
STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 96–98 (describing general changes in quantity
thresholds).
136
The number of quantity thresholds varied widely across states and over time. In 1975,
the largest number of quantity thresholds was found in New York (3); by 2000, eight states had
five or more such thresholds.
137
Several states also created quantity thresholds for LSD and PCP, however, not at the
same rate as the other substances listed. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 134.
138
STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 99.
139
Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 134.
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As penalty schemes became more complex, statutory minimum and
maximum sentences for offenses became much longer. Figure 4 shows the
evolution of the average statutory minimum sentences for first-offense possession and sale of twenty-eight grams (approximately one ounce) of cocaine across states.140 For both offense types, average statutory minimum
sentences increased steadily between 1975 and 2000, although they
plateaued in the early 1990s.141 Statutory minimum sentences for possession
moved from an average of thirteen months in 1975 to twenty-eight months
in 2000 (a 115% increase), while minimum sentences for sale moved from
an average of twenty-eight months to forty-one months (a 64% increase).142
Analyses of statutory minimum sentences for the possession and sale of marijuana and heroin follow similar patterns.143

Months

FIGURE 4. AVERAGE STATUTORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR POSSESSION
AND SALE OF TWENTY-EIGHT GRAMS OF COCAINE, 1975–2002
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Possession

Sale

140
STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 22–24. It is important to note that the sentences described here do not necessarily reflect the actual sentences imposed by judges or the actual
time served in these states; nor do these sentences represent mandatory minimum sentences for
the offense. Rather, this approach simply provides a comparison of the overall drug sentencing
structure and statutory minimum sentences available across states.
141
Id. The majority of states did not have statutory minimum sentences until the mid1980s (i.e., many states had statutory sentences ranges in the form of, for example, zero to ten
years).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 96. For example, statutory minimum sentences for possession of 28 grams of
heroin increased from 13 months in 1975 to 45 months in 2000 and minimum sentences for
sale increased from 33 months to 60 months during the same period. While statutory minimum
sentences are higher for heroin than cocaine, trends are very similar: the greatest increase in
minimum sentences occurred for both drugs between 1978 and 1981. After this period, the
upward movement is still observable but less pronounced.
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In addition to increasing the complexity of and lengthening minimum
sentences for drug offenses, states also increased the number and types of
sentencing enhancements for drug offenses. Laws that enhance penalties in
drug-free school zones are illustrative.144 In 1987, New Jersey became the
first state to adopt such a law, requiring judges to impose a sentence of at
least three years in prison for individuals convicted of sale or possession
with intent to sell drugs within one thousand feet of school property.145 In
1989, Louisiana passed a similar law allowing judges to impose a sentence
of up to one and a half times the maximum sentence for the underlying
offense for any offense of sale or possession with intent to sell committed
within one thousand feet of a school, including universities.146 Alabama arguably has the most expansive law, imposing an additional five-year
mandatory minimum prison sentence for a sale offense committed within
three miles of a school (including colleges) or public housing project.147
States created similar sentence enhancements based on location of the
offense (e.g., near a park or housing complex), excessive quantities of drugs
involved, weapons used, or involvement of minors.148 Figure 5 displays the
average number of such enhancements across the states for sale- or possession-related offenses. In 1975, states had an average of just three such enhancements for drug offenses involving sale or possession of cocaine,
heroin, or marijuana; by 2000, states had an average of just fewer than eight
enhancements for each substance.149
144
See generally Tracey A. Bateman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of State Statutes Prohibiting Sale or Possession of Controlled Substances Within Specified
Distance of Schools, 27 A.L.R. 5TH 593 (1995) (noting that by 2005, thirty-five states had
enacted drug free school zone laws). For a review of drug-free school zone policies across the
states, see, e.g., NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG-FREE ZONE LAWS: AN
OVERVIEW OF STATE POLICIES (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/Drug-Free-Zone-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5P9-7LH].
145
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7 (West 2010). The law was later amended to include public
parks. New Jersey provides no limitations under the law, with criminal liability based exclusively on the location of the offense; knowledge or awareness of one’s presence in a school
zone, presence of juveniles at the school, or intention to corrupt juveniles are not necessary
elements of the offense. See generally THE N.J. COMM’N TO REVIEW CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
REPORT ON NEW JERSEY’S DRUG FREE SCHOOL ZONE CRIMES AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
(2005), http://www.sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/supplemental%20schoolzonereport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LSJ3-V7C8] (describing the content of New Jersey’s laws concerning drug
free school zones).
146
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:981.3 (2014). The law was later amended to include offenses
within 2,000 feet of a school, drug treatment facility, religious facility, public housing complex, or day care center; the Louisiana law does not apply to offenses committed within private
residences when children are not present.
147
Ala. Code § 13A-12-250 (2017).
148
See generally STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 22 (examining state statutes that allow
for a sentence enhancement for the commission of a drug sale or possession offense when one
of the following factors are present: committed near a school, committed near a park, committed near a public housing complex, committed near a church, excessive quantities of drugs
involved, offense involves minors, offense involves weapons use, and offense involves gang
activity).
149
Id. at 99. Figures 4 and 5 indicate that sentencing laws for drug offenses generally
became harsher for all drug types during the 1980s and, while sentence lengths continued to
increase, they increased at a slower rate through the 1990s.
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FIGURE 5. AVERAGE NUMBER OF SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR SALE
POSSESSION OF COCAINE, HEROIN, OR MARIJUANA, 1975–2002150
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In addition to increasing minimum sentence ranges and creating sentence enhancements for drug offenses, states also passed a variety of
mandatory sentencing laws to ensure the imposition of a prison sentence
following conviction of a drug law violation. The most famous mandatory
sentencing laws may have been New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws passed
in 1973.151 Under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, any defendant convicted of
selling two ounces or possessing four ounces of heroin, morphine, raw or
prepared opium, cocaine, or cannabis received a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison.152 While the Rockefeller Drug Laws distinguished New York State as having the toughest drug laws in the United
States, other states soon followed. In 1978, for example, Michigan enacted
the “650-Lifer Law,” which created a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the sale, manufacture, or possession of 650 grams or more of a mixture containing a Schedule I or II narcotic
or cocaine.153
150

Id. at 99.
Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276 §§ 220.21, 220.43, 1973 N.Y. Laws 371, 380–81 (codified as amended in N.Y. Penal Law) (explaining that criminal possession of two or more
ounces of a controlled substance and criminal sale of one or more ounces of a controlled
substance are Class A-I felonies). In 1979, the Legislature doubled the weight of the drug
required for an A-I felony to two ounces or more for possession and four ounces or more for
sale). Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is it Time to Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 613, 625 (1999).
152
Id. The primary intent of the Rockefeller Drug Laws was to deter drug abuse and drug
crimes. See Rockefeller, Governor of New York, Annual Message To the members of the
Legislature of the State of New York (Jan. 3, 1973), in Public Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller,
at 21–22. However, subsequent evaluations showed that the law had little impact on drug
activity or crime. See, e.g., Edward J. Maggio, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, Then and
Now, 78 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 30, 31 (2006).
153
Controlled Substances Act by Public Act 147 of 1978, incorporated into the recodified
Public Health Code by Public Act 368 of 1978. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i)
151
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While other states did not enact sentencing policies as harsh as those in
New York and Michigan, nearly every state adopted some form of
mandatory sentences for drug offenses. For example, in South Dakota, a first
offense conviction of manufacture, sale, or possession with intent to sell a
narcotic drug carries a mandatory sentence of at least one year in prison; a
second or subsequent conviction carries a mandatory sentence of at least ten
years in prison.154 In Georgia, a first offense conviction of possession of a
Schedule I drug carries a mandatory sentence of at least two years in prison
and a second or subsequent conviction carries a mandatory sense of at least
five years in prison.155
Like the federal system, during the 1980s and 1990s, states significantly increased sentences for drug offenses and created sentencing schemes
that limited judges’ ability to deviate from mandatory sentences. These
changes laid the legal backbone of the war on drugs and articulated the state
and federal governments’ goals of sanctioning and the appropriate severity of
sanctions for drug offenses. As described above, underlying these changes
was a shift toward punishment and incapacitation and away from rehabilitation. The result was the historic increase in the number of individuals arrested and convicted of drug offenses as well as the mass incarceration of
drug offenders in the United States.
C. The Impact of the War on Drugs on Arrests and Sentences
As the war on drugs began in earnest in the 1980s, changes in enforcement produced a dramatic change in arrests. The number of people arrested
for drug law violations in the United States increased 227% between 1970
and 1989, from 415,000 arrests to 1.3 million arrests (Figure 6).156 Most of
(West Supp. 1990–1991) provides a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650
grams or more of any mixture containing a Schedule 2 controlled substance. The Michigan
legislation also required imprisonment for the sale, manufacture, or possession of lesser qualities. For example, Michigan required imprisonment of at least twenty years for offense involving between 225 and 650 grams; either imprisonment for at least ten years or lifetime
probation for a violation involving between 50 and 225 grams; imprisonment for up to twenty
years for manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver less than 50 grams;
and imprisonment for up to four years for possessing less than 50 grams. Probation, parole,
and suspension of sentence were prohibited during the period of the minimum sentences. For a
description of changes to the law, see PATRICK AFFHOLTER & BETHANY WICKSALL, STATE
NOTES TOPICS OF LEGISLATIVE INTEREST, ELIMINATING MICHIGAN’S MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCES FOR DRUG OFFENSES, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY (2002) (describing the history and
repeal of the 650-Lifer law).
154
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-42-2 (2017).
155
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30(c) (2016). The same statute sets out longer sentences for
distribution offenses in Georgia: a first offense conviction of distribution of a Schedule I or
Schedule II drug carries a mandatory sentence of at least five years in prison and a second or
subsequent conviction carries a mandatory sense of at least ten years in prison. Id. § 16-1330(d).
156
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1970–2014 series [hereinafter FBI CRIME REPORTS: 1970–2014], Tables 4.1 and 29 (Table 29 provides the total number
of drug law violation arrests; Table 4.1 provides the percent distribution of arrests for each
drug type. By combining the total arrests and percent distribution for each year, it is possible to
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this increase was due to arrests for cocaine or heroin, which increased 463%
during this period, from 130,000 arrests in 1970 to 732,000 arrests in
1989.157 However, this initial increase in arrests occurred during a period
when drug use in the United States was on the decline.158 For example, between 1978 (peak drug use rate) and 1989 (peak drug arrest rate), overall
rates of illicit drug use decreased 41% while drug arrest rates increased
117%.159 Drug arrests continued to rise to over 1.8 million arrests in 2006.160
However, unlike the 1980s, arrests in the 1990s mirrored drug use patterns
in the general population.161 After peaking in 2006, drug arrests then declined through 2014 to 1,488,707 arrests—yet, a rate that remains roughly
258% higher than in 1970.162

Number of people

FIGURE 6. NUMBER OF ARRESTS FOR DRUG OFFENSES AND NUMBER
PEOPLE INITIATING DRUG USE FOR FIRST TIME IN PREVIOUS
TWELVE MONTHS, 1970–2014163
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As a result of this dramatic increase in felony-level drug arrests, the
number of felony sentences also increased significantly. In federal court, the
calculate the total number of drug law violations by drug type for each year). See, e.g., FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1995, SECTION IV PERSONS ARRESTED,
at 207 (Table 4) and 208 (Table 29), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1995/95sec4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8UV-5YP7].
157
Id.
158
NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2002, supra note 48 (Tables H.35 and H.36 present the
number of people who first used marijuana or cocaine between 1965 and 2001).
159
Id; FBI CRIME REPORTS: 1970–2014,, supra note 156. During this period marijuana
use decreased 64% and cocaine use decreased 73%. Yet, between 1982 and 1992, overall drug
arrests increased 58%, with arrests for cocaine and heroin increasing 280%.
160
FBI CRIME REPORTS: 1970–2014,, supra note 156.
161
Between 1990 and 2000, for example, marijuana use increased 91%, cocaine use increased 8%, and heroin use increased 128%. NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2002, supra note
48.
162
FBI CRIME REPORTS: 1970–2014,, supra note 156.
163
Id.
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number of individuals convicted of a drug offense increased from just 4,000
individuals in 1978 to 26,000 individuals in 2010—an increase of over
550%.164 The number of felony drug sentences in state courts showed similarly large increases. State drug trafficking sentences increased 177% between 1986 and 2006, from roughly 76,000 sentences to over 212,000
sentences.165 Similarly, between 1990 and 2006, the number of felony drug
possession sentences increased 55%, from 106,000 sentences to over
165,000 sentences.166 What is strikingly different between the federal and
state sentencing trends is the percent of convictions resulting in a prison
sentence during this period—roughly 90% of federal sentences were to
prison compared to roughly 40% of state court sentences. It is also noteworthy that the probability of receiving a prison sentence for those convicted of
a drug felony in both federal and state courts did not appear to change dramatically during this period.
Despite the relative stability in the percentage of individuals sentenced
to prison in both federal and state courts, the average federal sentence length
increased substantially while the average state sentence length declined (Figure 7). Between 1978 and 1992, the average sentence imposed for a federal
drug offense increased from just over fifty months to nearly ninety
months.167 Despite decreasing by roughly eleven months through the 1990s,
the length of federal drug sentences increased again through the 2000s to
eighty-two months.168 Again, state courts have sentenced drug offenders
quite differently. Sentences for felony drug trafficking in state courts showed
a general decrease since the 1980s, dropping from forty-two months in 1986
to thirty-eight months by 2006.169 Sentences for felony drug possession in
state courts showed a larger decrease since the 1980s, dropping from just
thirty months in 1990 to twenty-three months by 2006.170

164
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.38.2010 http://www.albany
.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5382010.pdf [https://perma.cc/CTY2-R25D]; Derived from Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director (various years).
165
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1986 (1989), at
2 (Table 1); SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES, (2009) at 3 (Table 1.1).
166
PATRICK A. LANGAN & CRAIG A. PERKINS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
1990 (1994), at 2 (Table 1); ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 165.
167
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, supra note 165.
168
Id.
169
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1986 (1989), at
4 (Table 3); ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 165, at 6 (Table 1.3).
170
LANGAN & PERKINS, supra note 166, at 7 (Table 10); ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note
165, at 6 (Table 1.3).
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FIGURE 7. AVERAGE PRISON SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR A FELONY DRUG
OFFENSE IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURT, 1978–2006171
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These increases in arrests and prison sentences have fueled a significant
increase in the number of drug offenders held in both federal and state prisons. In 1980, federal prisons incarcerated just 4,900 people for drug offenses, representing roughly twenty-five percent of the federal prison
population.172 By 2014, those same prisons held 96,500 people for a drug
offense, accounting for 50% of the federal prison population and a 1,869%
increase since 1980.173 Moreover, by 2010, eighty percent of drug offenders
in federal prisons had been convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence.174 The states have seen a similarly dramatic increase in
drug offenders in prison. In 1980, state prisons incarcerated roughly 19,000
people for a drug offense, representing 6.5% of states’ total prison populations.175 By 2014, states cumulatively incarcerated roughly 208,000 people
for a drug offense—a 995% increase since 1980; drug offenders accounted
for 15.3% of states’ prison populations in 2014.176
D. The Racially Disparate Impact of the War on Drugs
The changes in arrests, convictions, and sentences at both the federal
and state levels have negatively impacted African American communities

171
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATES COURTS, annual series
1986–2009; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, supra note 148.
172
MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 9
173
E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014, 30 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUA9-WVPN].
174
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in
the Federal Criminal Justice System (Oct. 2011), Ch. 8, 165, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LV3-S8ZD].
175
MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 9
176
CARSON, supra note 173, at 30.
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more than other racial or ethnic groups.177 Some argue that this is because of
“the concentration of drug law enforcement in inner city areas; harsher sentencing policies, particularly for crack cocaine; and, the drug war’s emphasis
on law enforcement at the expense of prevention and treatment.”178 During
the mid-1980s, as the use of crack cocaine increased in inner-city neighborhoods, federal and state policymakers publicized the problem and used it to
expand law enforcement activities into predominantly African American
communities.179 The more aggressive enforcement resulted in dramatic increases in arrests of African Americans and the mandatory sentencing policies in place meant that a disproportionate number of these individuals were
sentenced to prison.
The disparity between drug use rates and arrest rates for African Americans and Whites highlights how dramatic this differential treatment is. African Americans and Caucasian-Americans use drugs at roughly the same
rate—19.5% of African Americans report using drugs in the previous year
compared to 16.9% of Caucasians.180 As a percentage of all drug users, African Americans represent roughly 15% of all current drug users.181 However,
arrest rates for the two groups are quite different. While African Americans
represent just fifteen percent of all current drug users, they accounted for
twenty-nine percent of all drug arrests in 2014.182 When considering arrests
rates, roughly 828 of every 100,000 African Americans were arrested for a
drug offense in 2014, compared to just 339 of every 100,000 Whites.183
Estimating the number of drug offenders in prison by race is more difficult. However, the Sentencing Project estimated that African Americans ac177

See MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 19–24.
Id. at 19.
179
ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 52–53.
180
NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2014, TABLES, supra note 28.
181
Id.; Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST0
45216/00 [https://perma.cc/TDE6-24BR]. The figures used in the Samhsa Table 1-19b were
combined with the population estimates from the Census Bureau to calculate the total number
of new drug users in 2014 and the total number of Black or African American drug users in
2014. Based on Census Bureau estimates, the 2015 U.S. population is estimated at
321,418,820 individuals and 13.3% of the population, or 42,748,703 individuals, is Black or
African American. According to Samhsa, 16.7% of the U.S. population, or 53,676,942 individuals, used illicit drugs in 2014 and 19.5% of Black or African American individuals, or
8,335,997 individuals, used illicit drugs in 2014. Thus, Black or African American individuals
represent roughly 15% of U.S. drug users in 2014 (8,335,997/53,676,942).
182
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, https://ucr.fbi
.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/6FHK-9E
T2].
183
Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 181. The figures used in the FBI Table 43 were
combined with the population estimates from the Census Bureau to calculate the arrest rates
for 2014. Based on Census Bureau estimates, the 2015 U.S. population is estimated at
321,418,820 individuals; 13.3% of the population, or 42,748,703 individuals, is Black or African American and 77.1% of the population, or 247,492,291 individuals, is White. According to
the FBI, 353,862 individuals identified as Black of African American and 837,851 individuals
identified as White were arrested for a drug abuse violation in 2014. Thus, the Black or African American drug arrest rate for 2014 was 827.7 arrests per 100,000 Black or African American population (353,862/427.48703) and the White drug arrest rate was 338.5 arrests per
100,000 White population (857,851/2,474.92291).
178

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-2\HLP206.txt

unknown

Seq: 28

Harvard Law & Policy Review

402

30-JUN-17

14:41

[Vol. 11

counted for fifty-seven percent of drug offenders in state prisons and fortythree percent of drug offenders in federal prison in 1999.184 By 2014, African
Americans accounted for a declining, but still disproportionate, percentage
of state and federal inmates incarcerated for drug offenses, composing thirtythree percent of inmates in state prisons and thirty-eight percent of inmates
in federal prison.185
The arrest rates and incarceration rates for African Americans are markedly disproportionate to African American representation in the U.S. population. When viewing the differences between the percentages of the U.S.
population, monthly users, drug arrests, and prisoners who are African
American, the racial disparity of the war on drugs becomes more apparent
(Figure 8).

Percent

FIGURE 8. AFRICAN AMERICANS AS A PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION,
DRUG USERS, ARRESTEES, AND INDIVIDUALS INCARCERATED
FOR A DRUG OFFENSE, 2014186
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184
MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE
WAR ON DRUGS 4, 6 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
The-Changing-Racial-Dynamics-of-the-War-on-Drugs.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBY7-TT3Y].
185
CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 30–31. The total numbers of individuals incarcerated in state prisons for a drug offense and the total number of Black individuals incarcerated in state prisons for a drug offense were taken from Appendix Table 5; the total numbers of
individuals incarcerated in federal prisons for a drug offense and the total number of Black
individuals incarcerated in federal prisons for a drug offense were taken from Appendix Table
6.
186
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 181; NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS: 2014, TABLES,,
supra note 28; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/
7TJ7-9S87]; CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 30, at 30–31.
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Since the 1970s, the U.S. prison population has exploded from 200,000
prisoners to more than two million prisoners, with the majority of the increase due to drug convictions.187 But the impact of the war on drugs has
been disproportionately felt by the African American community. While
these racially disparate impacts were quickly apparent, it was not until the
wider financial and social costs of the war markedly increased in the late
1990s and 2000s that states and the federal government began to reform
many of the sentencing policies adopted in the build-up of the war on drugs.
III. A SHIFT

IN THE

WAR: POLICY CHANGE SINCE 2000

As state incarceration rates continued to rise through the late 1990s,
policymakers and corrections administrators encountered growing fiscal
constraints and social scrutiny, which demanded that they evaluate the costeffectiveness and efficacy of incarceration as a response to drugs.188 Many
states responded by reclassifying drug offenses and revising sentencing
ranges, while several states moved to decriminalize or legalize low-level
drug possession.189 Other states responded by repealing mandatory prison
sentences for many drug offenses,190 while some implemented new
mandatory probation sentences in lieu of incarceration for individuals convicted of simple drug possession.191 Many state and local jurisdictions also
strengthened existing diversion programs as a way to further redirect drug
offenders away from prison.192 Although not seen as equally consequential
by some critics, several notable changes in federal approaches to drug enforcement occurred as well, including a reduction in the crack cocaine/powder cocaine sentence disparity,193 increased federal spending on drug
treatment,194 reductions in sentences for all drug offenses under the federal
187

MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 10 (2d ed. 2006).
MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS
INCARCERATION 85–91 (2005).
189
See generally SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16; SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY,
supra note 16 (giving an overview of recent changes in state drug statutes).
190
See generally SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16; SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY,
supra note 16.
191
Don Stemen et al., The Focal Concerns of Sentencing and Mandatory Sentencing
Laws: Circumvention in the Context of Mandatory Probation and Treatment, 38 J. OF CRIME &
JUSTICE 2 (2015) (discussing the content of mandatory probation laws in Kansas, California,
and Arizona).
192
See, e.g., CTR. FOR HEALTH & JUSTICE AT TASC, NO ENTRY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 30 (2013) (documenting the many
varied diversion programs from pre-arrest diversion to pre-trial diversion programs for drug
offenders implemented across the states and noting, “The relatively recent and rapid expansion
of intervention approaches such as drug and law enforcement crisis intervention and various
problem-solving courts suggests a growing institutional acceptance among policymakers and
practitioners that, in certain circumstances, less restrictive justice strategies may offer increased effectiveness in reducing recidivism and addressing substance use disorders and
mental illness, as well as greater efficiency in the use of public resources.”).
193
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
194
Novak & Reis, supra note 35.
188
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sentencing guidelines,195 and changes in federal prosecution policies for drug
offenses.196 Documenting all such reforms is beyond the scope of this article;
rather, this part focuses on a select set of reforms, which illustrate a trend in
alternative sentencing policies. For a detailed account of nearly all changes
in state-level drug laws enacted between 2009 and 2013, the Vera Institute of
Justice’s recent report is an excellent resource.197
A. Reclassifying, Decriminalizing, and Legalizing
Many states have taken the first step toward undoing the drug sentencing laws enacted during the 1980s and 1990s by reclassifying drug offenses
(e.g., by downgrading offenses to lower felony classes or to misdemeanors)
and by increasing quantity thresholds necessary before prosecutors consider
an offense as a felony. In many instances, these efforts have decriminalized
some drug offenses, primarily marijuana offenses.
Colorado illustrates how states, perhaps tentatively, have approached
the reclassification of drug offenses. Since 2000, Colorado has revised sentencing provisions related to drug offenses three times.198 In 2003, the state
reclassified possession of less than one gram of Schedule I or II drugs to a
Class 6 felony (the lowest level felony class) for first offenders and from a
Class 2 to a Class 4 felony for repeat offenders.199 In 2010, the state again
lowered the classification levels for possession of controlled substances, reclassifying all drug use offenses as Class 2 misdemeanors, reclassifying
Schedule III, IV, or IV possession offenses as Class 1 misdemeanors, and
reclassifying Schedule I or II possession offenses of under four grams as
Class 6 felonies (down from a Class 4 felony).200 In 2013, Colorado reclassified all felony possession offenses as the lowest drug felony level, regardless
of weight.201
Several states have taken similar steps to reclassify possession offenses
as either lower-level felonies or misdemeanors. In 2011, for example, Arkansas reclassified drug offenses and removed legal presumptions that possession of certain quantities constituted possession with intent.202 In 2011,
Delaware revised much of its criminal code, reclassifying some drug offenses previously classified as felonies to misdemeanors.203 Finally, in 2013,
Indiana reclassified possession of marijuana and other low-level drug of195

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 22, at 1–2.
Cole Memorandum, supra note 23 (adopting prosecution policies declining in most
cases to use federal law to prosecute state-licensed growers and retailers of marijuana); Holder
Memorandum, supra note 23 (declining to charge low-level, non-violent drug offenders with
offenses carrying mandatory minimum sentences); Smith, supra note 23 (noting that President
Obama had granted clemency to 1,176 individuals).
197
SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16.
198
Id. at 10–11, 14.
199
S.B. 03-318, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2003).
200
SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16, at 14.
201
Id. at 15.
202
Id. at 14.
203
Id. at 8.
196
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fenses from felonies to misdemeanors and reduced the felony classifications
of possession of more serious drugs.204 The U.S. Sentencing Commission
also amended the federal sentencing guidelines in 2014 to reduce most drug
trafficking offenses by two offense levels under the guidelines; the Commission also voted to make the amendment retroactive, allowing eligible incarcerated offenders to ask courts to reduce their sentences.205
Several states went a step further and decriminalized marijuana possession, making possession a civil infraction rather than a crime.206 For example, in 2008, Massachusetts reduced possession of one ounce or less of
marijuana to a civil infraction carrying a $100 fine.207 In 2010, California
converted possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana from a misdemeanor offense to an infraction, punishable by a $100 fine.208 In 2011, Connecticut converted possession of less than half an ounce of marijuana for
personal use and many drug paraphernalia offenses to an infraction punishable by a fine.209 And, in 2013, Vermont converted possession of up to one
ounce of marijuana from a misdemeanor to an infraction punishable by a
$200 fine.210
Most notably, a number of states have moved to legalize the possession
of marijuana for recreational use. In 2012, Colorado and Washington legalized the possession and distribution of up to one ounce of marijuana for
personal use.211 Since 2014, five additional states—California, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon—as well as the District of Columbia similarly have legalized the distribution and possession of small amounts of

204
Id. at 15. Although not as dramatic, in 2011, North Dakota downgraded manufacture,
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver more than one hundred pounds of
marijuana from a Class A to a Class B felony. Id. at 14. In 2012, Georgia reclassified drug
offenses using quantity thresholds; in the past, purchasing or possessing any quantity of drugs
carried the same maximum sentence of fifteen years; the fifteen-year maximum now only
applies to purchase or possession of four to twenty-eight grams. Id. at 14–15.
205
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL AMEND. TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004).
206
See generally Walter R. Cuskey et al., The Effects of Marijuana Decriminalization on
Drug Use Patterns: A Literature Review and Research Critique, 7 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS.
491 (1978) (discussing the various efforts in the 1970s to decriminalize marijuana). Oregon led
the state movement to decriminalize recreational marijuana use in 1973 when it made the
possession of small amounts of marijuana a civil offense punishable by a fine rather than a
criminal offense punishable by incarceration or supervision; between 1973 and 1978, ten more
states similarly decriminalized possession of marijuana: Alaska (1975), Colorado (1975), Ohio
(1975), Maine (1976), California (1976), Minnesota (1976), Mississippi (1977), New York
(1977), North Carolina (1977), and Nebraska (1978). Id.
207
David Abel, Voters Approve Marijuana Law Change, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/11/05/voters_approve_marijuana_law_
change/ [https://perma.cc/7AHB-7C89] (noting that voters approved a ballot initiative making
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana punishable by a civil fine of $100).
208
S.B. 1449, 2009–10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
209
S.B. 1014, Public Act No. 11-71 (Conn. 2011).
210
H. 200, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013).
211
Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-lawseased-in-colorado-and-washington.html [https://perma.cc/9HF4-XZH6].
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marijuana.212 The federal response to legalization efforts is less clear. President Obama declared that “it’s important for [legalization of marijuana] to
go forward”213 at the state level; and the Justice Department under President
Obama adopted prosecution policies declining in most cases to use federal
law to prosecute state-licensed growers and retailers of marijuana,214 indicating tacit approval of legalization efforts. Recent comments by both Attorney
General Jeff Sessions and White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, however, indicate that the Trump administration is poised to increase enforcement of federal drug laws to address recreational marijuana use, even in
those states in which it is legal.215
There are strong incentives, however, to continue legalizing, reclassifying, and decriminalizing drug offenses. First, recent polls indicate strong
public support for legalization—fifty-nine percent of citizens believe recreational marijuana use should be legal; there is also strong public opposition to
the enforcement of federal laws against marijuana in states that have legalized recreation or medical marijuana—seventy-one percent of citizens are
against federal enforcement in such instances.216 Second, in the first year of
legalization, Washington generated $220 million and Colorado generated
$129 million in taxes; and neither state has experienced a notable increase in
crime or substance abuse following legalization.217 Some project that the legal marijuana market will generate $23 billion in annual revenue by 2020.218

212

Trevor Hughes, After Election, Where Could It Be Legal To Smoke Pot?, USA TODAY
(Nov. 8, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/
11/08/marijuana-legalization-recreational-medical-california-nevada-voters-decide/93483760/
[https://perma.cc/YHD5-QYM9].
213
David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distancedavid-remnick [https://perma.cc/37DU-KBD9].
214
Cole Memorandum, supra note 22.
215
Tessa Berenson, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Just Hinted at a Crackdown on Legal
Marijuana, TIME (Feb. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4685414/jeff-sessions-recreational-marijua
na-legal-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/L7UY-25DR] (quoting Attorney General Sessions as
saying, “States, they can pass the laws they choose . . . I would just say, it does remain a
violation of federal law to distribute marijuana throughout any place in the United States,
whether a state legalizes it or not.” Also quoting Sean Spicer as saying, “I do believe you’ll
see greater enforcement of [marijuana laws].”).
216
Quinnipiac University Poll (Feb. 23, 2017), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?
ReleaseID=2432 [https://perma.cc/CU65-4SEM] (finding that fifty-nine percent of respondents supported legalizing marijuana in the United States, ninety-five percent of respondents
supported legalized marijuana for medical purposes if prescribed by a doctor, and seventy-two
percent did not support the federal government should enforce federal laws against marijuana
in states that have legalized medical or recreational marijuana use).
217
Christopher Ingraham, Here’s How Legal Pot Changed Colorado and Washington,
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2006) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/13/
heres-how-legal-pot-changed-colorado-and-washington/?utm_term=.e053611ba487 [https://
perma.cc/5DSX-HNYG]. In the other states legalizing marijuana use, the effects of legalization have not yet been felt, primarily because the changes are relatively recent.
218
Trevor Hughes, Legal Marijuana Sales Forecast to Hit $23 Billion in Four Years, USA
TODAY (Mar. 20, 2016, 10:46 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2016/03/
20/legal-marijuana-sales-forecast-hit-23b-4-years/82046018/ [https://perma.cc/W34E-RC7S].
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Given the increased revenues generated from such policies and the
seeming lack of public safety concerns, the attraction of legalization will
likely continue in other states. The movements toward reclassifying and
decriminalizing drug use will likely continue as well, as states look for ways
to reduce prison populations. States like Illinois219 and Alaska,220 whose governor and legislature (respectively) called for a twenty-five percent reduction
in state prison populations, are targeting changes to low-level drug offenses
as non-controversial means of achieving long-term prison reductions. Thus,
as states look for ways to either generate revenue or make more effective use
of scarce revenue, these reforms will likely continue to expand.
B. Repealing Mandatory Sentencing Laws
One of the most significant parts of the legislative response to the war
on drugs through the 1980s and 1990s was the proliferation of mandatory
sentencing laws.221 In turn, one of the most consequential and symbolic legal
changes since 2000 has been the repeal of many mandatory sentencing
schemes.
The repeal of New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws in 2009 may be the
most well known. As noted above, under the original Rockefeller Drug
Laws, in place since the 1970s, any defendant convicted of selling two
ounces or possessing four ounces of heroin, morphine, raw or prepared
opium, cocaine, or cannabis received a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison.222 The repeal eliminated mandatory sentences and allowed many drug offenders to become eligible for diversion and drug
treatment rather than incarceration.223 Although the repeal of the Rockefeller
Drug Laws may be the most well-known repeal effort, New York was certainly not the first state to repeal harsh mandatory sentencing laws for drug
offenses. In 2001, Indiana eliminated mandatory minimums for certain nonviolent drug offenses and gave judges discretion to sentence offenders to
home detention and work release; the law also granted judges discretion to
divert from prison drug offenders who sold drugs to support their personal
219
ILL. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SENTENCING REFORM, FINAL REPORT 3
(2016), http://www.icjia.org/cjreform2015/pdf/CJSR_Final_Report_Dec_2016.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/82F5-CSRD]. To accomplish that goal, the report recommends a reduction of one felony class for all drug offenses, including reducing the lowest-level felony drug offenses to
misdemeanors. Id. at 58.
220
ALA. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 19 (2015), http://
www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/acjc/recommendations/ak_justice_reinvest
ment_intiative_report_to_acjc_12-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTP4-J74Y] (recommending reclassifying simple possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine as a misdemeanor
offense, and limiting the maximum penalty for first-and second-time possession offenses to
one month and six month suspended sentences, respectively).
221
See STEMEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 118–26.
222
Rockefeller, supra note 152. However, subsequent evaluations showed that the law had
little impact on drug activity or crime. See, e.g., MAGGIO, supra note 152, at 30–36.
223
JIM PARSONS ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, END OF AN ERA? THE IMPACT OF DRUG
LAW REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY 4 (2015).
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use.224 In 2002, Michigan eliminated most mandatory minimum sentences
for drug offenses, reduced supervision terms for low-level drug offenses
from lifetime supervision to five years probation, and revised drug quantity
thresholds;225 upon passage of the law, roughly 1,200 Michigan prisoners
sentenced under the old mandatory minimum sentences became eligible for
earlier parole consideration226 and roughly 7,000 low-level drug offenders
became eligible for discharge from life-time probation.227 In 2003, Delaware
decreased mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking offenses,
doubled quantity thresholds for drug trafficking to ten grams, and eliminated
a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for a second-offense sale
or possession with intent to sell;228 in 2011, Delaware again revised most of
its existing drug code, repealing mandatory sentences for most low-level
drug offenses.229
The repeal of federal mandatory minimums has been much less dramatic. In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which eliminated
the mandatory five-year prison sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine.230 Nonetheless, other mandatory sentences remain. In the 1990s, however, Congress adopted a “safety valve,” allowing judges to avoid the
imposition of a mandatory drug sentence if five factors are met: the defendant has a minimal criminal history, the offense did not involve violence or a
firearm, the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury, the defendant was not a leader in the offense, and that the defendant cooperated in
providing information to the prosecution.231 Of the roughly 24,000 federal
224
H.B. 1892 2001 Reg. Sess., (Ind. 2001); see also SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra
note 16, at 22.
225
SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra note 16, at 7, 14.
226
Id. at 14.
227
FAMM’s Guide to the Michigan Sentencing Reforms, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY
MINIMUMS (2002), http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Guide%20to%20MI%20reforms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6E2U-YMN5] (noting that at the time of enactment 6,864 people were currently serving lifetime supervision).
228
H.B. 210 2003 Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003); see also SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra note
16, at 22.
229
SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16, at 14. The Vera Institute of Justice report
notes a long list of states repealing mandatory sentencing policies: in 2009, New Jersey
amended a mandatory sentencing law to allow judges to waive a mandatory three-year sentence and, instead, place an offender on probation following a conviction for distributing,
dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within one
thousand feet of a school; in 2009, Minnesota removed a mandatory minimum prison sentence
for low-level drug offenses, allowing a judge to sentence individuals to probation for a conviction of a fifth-degree controlled substance sale or possession; in 2009, Rhode Island removed a
ten-year mandatory sentence for the manufacture, sale, or possession with intent to manufacture or sell less than one kilogram of a Schedule I or II controlled substance and removed a
twenty-year mandatory sentence for offenses involving more than one kilogram. In 2010,
South Carolina passed a comprehensive reform package that eliminated mandatory minimum
sentences for a conviction of simple drug possession, allowed the possibility of probation for
certain drug offense convictions, and added a “knowledge element” applicable to school-zone
drug offenses (i.e., prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knew
they were selling controlled substances in a designated school-zone area).
230
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).
231
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012).
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drug offenders convicted in 2006, about thirty-seven percent (9,115 individuals) received such a “safety valve” sentence.232
Although the federal government has not moved as quickly as the states
to repeal mandatory sentences, the trend in both the federal and state systems
is clearly toward repeal. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has continually
pressed for the repeal of federal mandatory sentencing policies and the reduction of guideline sentences for drug offenses. Moreover, states are repealing mandatory sentencing policies for many types of offenses, not just
drug offenses; thus, the trend away from mandatory sentences and toward
more discretion in sentencing is likely to continue.
C. Mandating Probation
Indeed, the movement in some states is toward mandatory probation.
While many states repealed mandatory prison sentences over the last fifteen
years, several states went one step further, creating mandatory probation
sentences in lieu of incarceration for some drug offenses. In 1996, Arizona
voters created a mandatory probation sentence for low-level drug possession
with the passage of Proposition 200.233 Proposition 200 requires judges to
impose a probation sentence for all non-violent offenders convicted of a first
or second offense of drug possession. When initially enacted, it also required
the state to release all non-violent drug offenders currently in prison.234 According to initial reports, Proposition 200 diverted over 2,600 offenders from
prison in the first year and saved Arizona taxpayers $2.6 million.235 In 2000,
California voters passed Proposition 36, creating a similar mandatory probation sentence for all non-violent offenders convicted of a first or second
offense of drug possession.236 Despite evidence of some circumvention of

232
MATTHEW IACONETTI, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, IMPACT OF PRIOR MINOR OFFENSES
ELIGIBILITY FOR SAFETY VALVE 4 (Mar. 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2009/20090316_Safety_Valve.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2BPL-2VSR].
233
Drug Medicalization, Prevention and Control Act of 1996, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-901.01 (2016).
234
Arizona Secretary of State, 1996 Ballot Propositions, Proposition 200 §§ 8–9, https://
www.azsos.gov/sites/azsos.gov/files/1996-ballot-propositions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PDK7CQD] (According to analyses by the Legislative Council, Proposition 200 required “that
persons who have been convicted before the proposition passes of the personal possession or
use of a controlled substance such as marijuana and who are serving their sentence in prison be
released on parole.”).
235
Hector Tobar, Drug Diversion Law in Arizona Paying Dividends, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21,
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/21/news/mn-29508 [https://perma.cc/6PET2YKT].
236
See SCOTT EHLERS & JASON ZIEDENBERG, PROPOSITION 36: FIVE YEARS LATER, JUSTICE POLICY INST. 2 (2006), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
prop36.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRT4-2FRF]; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(1) (Westlaw
through 2012) (individuals are ineligible for Proposition 36 if they have a prior conviction for
a serious or violent felony, or they are convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor or
felony offense not related to drug use).

ON
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the law,237 Proposition 36 resulted in a thirty-two percent reduction in admissions to prison for drug possession and a twenty-seven percent reduction in
the number of people in California prisons for drug possession during the
first four years after implementation.238 The law, however, had little impact
on recidivism rates of program participants.239 Kansas soon followed suit,
creating mandatory probation sentences for some offenders convicted of
drug possession.240 Evaluations of the Kansas mandatory probation law
found that it diverted few people from prison241 and had little impact on
recidivism rates;242 however, researchers did find that the law significantly
increased access to treatment in the state.243
In recent years, a number of additional states have created presumptive
probation sentences for low-level drugs offenses as well. For example, in
2011, Kentucky created presumptive probation sentences for first-time lowlevel trafficking offenders; first- and second-time possession offenders who
do not receive deferred prosecution must also be given presumptive probation sentences.244 In 2013, Colorado created a presumptive probation sentence for low-level felony drug offenders and South Dakota created a
presumptive probation sentence for all Class 5 and Class 6 felonies, which
include many drug offenses.245
Overall, mandatory and presumptive probation sentences send a clear
message that probation should be the default sentence for many low-level
drug offenses. In addition to moving toward reclassification and decriminalization of drug offenses, many states are moving toward either communitybased sanctions or fines for many types of low-level drug offenses.
237
See Gregory A. Forest, Comment, Proposition 36 Eligibility: Are Courts and Prosecutors Following or Frustrating the Will of Voters?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 639–41 (2005)
(finding that prosecutors increased charges, added misdemeanor charges, or filed more serious
alternative charges to make some defendants ineligible under the law); Alex Ricciardulli, Getting to the Roots of Judges’ Opposition to Drug Treatment Initiatives, 25 WHITTIER L. REV.
309, 367–96 (2003) (finding that judges found defendants guilty of offenses that made them
ineligible for Proposition 36 and ignored disqualifying prior offenses to sentence otherwise
ineligible drug possessors to prison).
238
See Ehlers & Ziedenberg, supra note 206, at 4–5.
239
See DARREN URADA ET AL., EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 36: THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000, 2008 REPORT, 201–09 (2008) (finding little difference
in three-year recidivism rates for Proposition 36 participants relative to a comparison group).
240
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4729 (repealed 2011). Hawaii passed a similar law in 2002, S.B.
1188 21st Leg. (Haw. 2002) (creating mandatory treatment and probation for first-time, nonviolent offenders convicted of drug possession or use. However, similar evaluations of the impact of the law are not available).
241
Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Reconciling the Multiple Objectives of Drug Diversion Programs: Evidence from Kansas’ Senate Bill 123, 35 EVALUATION REV. 642, 663–64
(2011).
242
Andres F. Rengifo & Don Stemen, The Impact of Drug Treatment on Recidivism: Do
Mandatory Programs Make a Difference? Evidence from Kansas’ Senate Bill 123, 59 CRIME
AND DELINQ. 930, 932 (2013).
243
Don Stemen & Andres Rengifo, Mandating Treatment for Drug Possessors: The Impact of Senate Bill 123 on the Criminal Justice System in Kansas, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 296, 300
(2009).
244
SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16, at 15.
245
Id. at 15–16.
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D. Expanding Deferred Prosecution and Drug Courts
In recent years, local jurisdictions have sought to expand alternatives to
traditional adjudication for drug offenders through deferred prosecution and
drug courts. Deferred prosecution programs are a type of diversion program
that redirects eligible persons charged with certain offenses from traditional
prosecution and court proceedings into a program that monitors participants’
progress toward specific goals (e.g., drug treatment or community service).
These programs often have the aim of dismissing charges upon successful
completion.246 Although prosecutors have historically had discretion to exercise deferred prosecution,247 Kentucky in 2011 made deferred prosecution
the presumptive outcome for first- and second-time possession offenses.248
Under the law, a prosecutor may deny a request for deferred prosecution
only by providing substantial and compelling reasons.249 Even then, when
the state denies defendants deferred prosecution, it must give them a presumptive probation sentence.250 In 2011, North Carolina expanded eligibility
for deferred prosecution to all first-time felony drug possession defendants
and required that all eligible defendants participate in the program.251 Finally, in 2011, Ohio expanded eligibility for deferred prosecution to offenders whose drug use contributed to the commission of the offense, which
extended deferred prosecution beyond those charged with a drug offense.252
Since the late 1980s, local jurisdictions have also responded to the dramatic increase in drug offenses by developing specialized drug courts to
handle only drug offenses and those with substance abuse problems.253 These
drug treatment courts focus on providing therapeutic services to those identified as substance abusers.254 Since Miami-Dade County established the first
drug court in the United States in 1989, drug courts spread rapidly throughout the country; by 2009, over 1,600 drug courts were operating in the
United States.255 Despite their popularity, not all jurisdictions had the option
to create a drug court. In recent years, several state legislatures—Alabama,
Indiana, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota—have authorized local jurisdictions to do so.256 In 2013, West Virginia went beyond simply authorizing

246
Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 163, 169 (2009).
247
Id. at 186.
248
SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16, at 18.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
See, e.g., CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41448, DRUG COURTS: BACKGROUND, EFFECTIVENESS, AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (2010).
254
See id. at 9.
255
RYAN S. KING & JILL PASUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2009).
256
See SUBRAMANIAN & MORENO, supra note 16, at 19–21.
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localities to create drug courts by requiring every judicial district in the state
to establish a drug court by July 1, 2016.257
Although drug courts and diversion are not new tools, the recent expansion of these alternatives is an indication that traditional approaches to drug
offenses are no longer desired. More importantly, the expansion of eligibility
for these programs to individuals who are not charged with a drug offense,
but who have a substance abuse problem, is a further indication that policymakers are beginning to look toward addressing the underlying causes of
crime and to move away from simply criminalizing substance abuse.
E. Conclusion
The recent reforms adopted in the states—decriminalization, legalization, mandatory probation, drug courts, and deferred prosecution—seek to
divert individuals from prison and, in some instances, to require individuals
to engage in drug treatment. The use of such diversion programs and compulsory drug treatment has long been a key component of U.S. drug policy,258 and research indicates that such forms of compulsory drug treatment
can have a positive impact on a number of key outcomes, including reducing
drug use and criminal behavior.259 The recent expansion of alternatives like
drug courts to populations beyond drug offenders is a further indication of a
clear movement away from criminalization and toward treatment as a response to drug offenses. Indeed, the last fifteen years has seen a significant
shift in the war on drugs, and the increased acceptance of opioid addiction as
a medical problem will likely continue this trend.
IV. AFTER

THE

WAR: MOVING BEYOND

THE

WAR

ON

DRUGS

While some of the recent reforms were initially brought on by fiscal
concerns over the rising costs of incarceration associated with drug offenses,
additional concerns about the proportionality of drug sentences and the effectiveness of harsh sentencing practices to combat drug use have affected
calls for change. Moreover, during these shifts, two phenomena occurred:
the rise in the use and abuse of prescription drugs (primarily opioids) and the
257

Id. at 21.
For reviews of compulsory treatment programs, see M. Douglas Anglin & Yi Hser,
Criminal Justice and the Drug-abusing Offender: Policy Issues of Coerced Treatment, 9
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 243, 244–48 (1991); James A. Inciardi, Compulsory Treatment in New York:
A brief Narrative History of Misjudgment, Mismanagement, and Misrepresentation, 18 J.
DRUG ISSUES, 547, 549–56 (1988).
259
See, e.g., Adele Harrell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Courts and the Role of Graduated
Sanctions (1998); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effectiveness of Drug Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 171, 189–91 (2003); BETH M.
HUEBNER & JENNIFER COBBINA, The Effect of Drug Use, Drug Treatment participation, and
Treatment Completion on Probationer Recidivism, 22 J. DRUG ISSUES 619, 620–22 (2007);
Douglas Young et al., Criminal Recidivism in Three Models of Mandatory Drug Treatment, 27
J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 313, 319–22 (2004).
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increased acceptance of marijuana use. These phenomena have further
shifted both the rhetoric and response to drug use away from strict criminal
justice responses to a more medical, treatment-based response to drug use.
A. Opioids and Prescription Drug Abuse
Beginning in the 1980s, pain management advocates began a campaign
against undertreated pain.260 This effort led to a liberalization in the use of
narcotics to treat pain, the rise of opiates as one of the most widely prescribed pharmaceuticals in the United States,261 and, by the 2000s, a new
“epidemic”262 of prescription drug abuse. Indeed, as the prescription of
opioids for pain management increased, the ready availability and use of
prescription drugs was normalized and the use of prescription drugs for nonmedical purposes increased as well.
In recent years, the misuse of prescription drugs has become a growing
public health concern. National estimates from the 2014 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) report that nearly 4.3 million Americans
had used prescription pain relievers for non-medical purposes.263 The 2013
Treatment Episodes Data Set (TEDS) reported that the number of individuals
admitted to substance abuse treatment facilities due to non-heroin opiate/
opioid abuse increased 570% between 1999 and 2013, from 23,000 admissions to more than 154,000.264 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that in 2015, over thirty-three thousand opioid-related deaths
occurred in the United States, accounting for sixty percent of all drug-related
deaths in the United States.265

260
Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324478304578173
342657044604 [https://perma.cc/FJ3S-XEAS].
261
Matthew Herper, America’s Most Popular Drugs, FORBES (May 11, 2010) https://www
.forbes.com/2010/05/11/narcotic-painkiller-vicodin-business-healthcare-popular-drugs.html
[ https://perma.cc/FHV8-FSNL] (noting that Hydrocodone, a narcotic, was the most prescribed
drug in 2010, citing a report from IMS Health, a company that tracks sales).
262
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BY THE NUMBERS, (2016)
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/Factsheet-opioids-061516.pdf (describing both opioid
abuse and opioid-related deaths and “epidemic”).
263
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE
2014 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 7 (2015), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/
sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-2014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGG69ZTN].
264
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT EPISODES DATA SET (TEDS) 2003–2013 (2015), at 45, tbl.1.1a
(2015), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/2003_2013_TEDS_National/2003_
2013_Treatment_Episode_Data_Set_National.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6M-N5PU]; SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
TREATMENT EPISODES DATA SET (TEDS) HIGHLIGHTS–2002 (2004), at 4, tbl.1a (2004), https://
wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/dasis2/teds_pubs/2002_teds_highlights_rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK7
G-5MK9].
265
Rudd et al. supra note 32.
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In the end, the rise of prescription drug addiction and overdoses in the
2000s led many pain management advocates to admit that the push for the
increased availability and use of opiates ignored many of the potential risks
of addiction and abuse.266 As patients continue to seek pain relief, the rise of
opioid abuse calls into question medicine’s approach to pain management
and creates new conflicts in United States approaches to illegal drug use.
Indeed, the question of how to address prescription drug misuse falls to both
health care professionals and criminal justice system actors and creates conflicts between legitimate approaches for treating pain and the punishment for
engaging in the illegal use of drugs. Moreover, because the illegal use of
drugs in this context often begins from a legitimate, legal use of such drugs,
the response has been more focused on treatment than punishment, marking
a significant change in both national rhetoric and practice around drug
abuse.267
The medical community has begun to address the issue by better policing prescriptions and long-term patient use of such drugs, indicating a movement toward supply reduction by decreasing prescriptions and targeting
doctors to change prescription practices. This is markedly different than the
supply reduction practices surrounding illicit, non-prescription drugs (i.e.,
cocaine, heroin, etc.), since the pharmaceutical and medical communities
largely can control supply as both the sellers and distributors of these drugs.
Given the medical community’s recognition that a change in practice must
occur, the abuse of prescription opioids may decrease. However, the decrease in the availability of prescription opioids has already led to an increase in heroin use in many parts of the country, as people search for
alternatives.268 Thus, there is likely not a quick end to the opioid epidemic.
Nonetheless, the prevalence of legitimate opioid use and subsequent
opioid addiction has also somewhat normalized or humanized drug addiction. In the long term, this can change the national perspective on many drug
offenses, particularly possession offenses. Since opioid use is seen as legitimate and opioid addiction may be seen as accidental, this may change how
policymakers and the public perceive substance use and abuse. Indeed,
opioid addiction is seen as requiring a medical treatment response—the most
appropriate response to a medically induced problem. Moreover, the recent
rise of heroin use is often discussed as an unfortunate side effect of both
opioid addiction and efforts to reduce it. This has the potential to carry over
to the abuse of other substances, which may be seen as the result of other
underlying circumstances similar to opioid addiction.

266

See Catan & Perez, supra note 260.
See Tim Dickinson & Ethan Nadelmann, The Real Drug Czar, ROLLING STONE (June 6,
2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/ethan-nadelmann-the-real-drug-czar20130606 [https://perma.cc/Z7MV-ZHG2?type=image]; Dickinson, supra 24.
268
Theodore J. Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis, & Hillary S. Surratt, Effect of Abuse-Deterrent
Formulation of OxyContin, NEW ENG. J. MED., 367:187–89 (2012) (noting that when access to
OxyContin decreased, sixty-six percent of patients abusing OxyContin “indicated a switch to
another opioid, with ‘heroin’ the most common response”).
267
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Indeed, the discussion of criminal justice responses has sparked a debate about the need to embrace a treatment approach to substance abuse.
Speaking at the National Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Summit in
2016, President Obama, for example, noted, “[F]or too long, we have
viewed the problem of drug abuse generally in our society through the lens
of the criminal justice system. . . . [T]he only way that we reduce demand is
if we’re . . . thinking about this as a public health problem.”269 On the same
day, the White House released a plan for “$1.1 billion in new funding to
help every American with an opioid use disorder who wants treatment to get
the help they need.”270 There is strong support even among conservative
policymakers to provide overdose-reversal drugs to law enforcement officers271 and to create needle exchange programs.272
As some observers note, “The severity of the epidemic has worn down
historic Republican resistance to public health driven drug policy.”273 But
this may be due to the demographics of prescription drug users—opioid
abuse and overdose deaths affect a wider cross-section of Americans. While
African Americans remain over-represented among those arrested and incarcerated for a drug offense, Whites account for a large percent of drug overdose deaths. In 2014, Whites accounted for eighty-three percent of all drug
overdose deaths in the United States and eighty-five percent of all opioidrelated overdose deaths.274 As President Obama noted in his announcement
shifting the U.S. approach to opioids:
Part of what has made it previously difficult to emphasize treatment over the criminal justice system has to do with the fact that
269
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in Panel Discussion at the National Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Summit (Mar. 29, 2016), in The
White House, President Barack Obama, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/remarks-president-panel-discussion-national-prescription-drug-abuse-and
[https://perma.cc/J2QZ-5QQW].
270
FACT SHEET: Obama Administration Announces Additional Actions to Address the
Prescription Opioid Abuse and Heroin Epidemic, The White House, PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA (Mar. 28, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/28/
fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-additional-actions-address [https://perma.cc/
3ELS-JAXB].
271
Corey S. Davis et al., Engaging Law Enforcement in Overdose Reversal Initiatives:
Authorization and Liability for Naloxone Administration, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 8, 1530–37
(noting that in 2015, more than 220 law enforcement agencies carried naloxone resulting in
more than 10,000 administered overdose reversals administered by police officers).
272
Audie Cornish & Hal Rogers, Congress Ends Ban On Federal Funding For Needle
Exchange Programs, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/08/4624126
31/congress-ends-ban-on-federal-funding-for-needle-exchange-programs [https://perma.cc/
U2YL-UU47].
273
Dickinson, supra note 24.
274
Rose A. Rudd, et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths—United States,
2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378 (2016) (Figures in Table 1
report a total of 47,055 drug overdose deaths in 2014 and 37,945 drug overdose deaths involving White individuals in 2014; thus, White individuals account for 80.6% of total drug overdose deaths); Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—
United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445 (2016) (Figures
in Tables 1 and 2 report total and race-specific numbers of opioid overdose deaths in 2014).
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the populations affected in the past were . . . stereotypically identified as poor, minority . . . . And I think that one of the things that’s
changed in this opioid debate is a recognition that this reaches
everybody.275
Indeed, this has accompanied a marked change in how policymakers
talk about drug users, moving away from focusing on “junkies” and “addicts” to discussing Americans with “opioid abuse disorders.”276 This shift
in rhetoric is profoundly significant in the racial context of the war on drugs,
which disproportionately affected African Americans and equated inner-city
minority neighborhoods with drugs and crime.277 As the prevalence of opioid
addiction and the rise of heroin abuse becomes somewhat normalized in
non-minority communities, this shift in rhetoric around all substance use
will likely continue. Moreover, as the medical use of marijuana increases,
there is an opening for a change in approach to not just prescription drugs,
but other illicit drugs as well.
B. Marijuana
As noted above, state-level approaches to decriminalizing and legalizing recreational marijuana use have shifted considerably over the last fifteen
years. At the same time, more than half the states have moved to legalize the
medical use of marijuana. By the end of 2016, seven states had legalized
recreational marijuana, seventeen states had decriminalized marijuana possession, and twenty-eight states had legalized the medical use of marijuana.278 Thus, at the state level, rhetoric and practice around the use of
marijuana has shifted considerably.
This shift is driven by a variety of changes in attitudes as public perceptions of marijuana use nationally have moved significantly toward legalization.279 Part of this shift is the increasing support for the perceived medicinal
benefits of marijuana and strong near universal support for the legalization
of medicinal use of marijuana.280 It is also driven by a realization of the
economic benefits of marijuana legalization. Research firms estimate that
the national legal market for recreational and medicinal marijuana is $7.1
billion annually281 and states have already experienced significant tax revenues from legalized recreational marijuana sales.282
The federal government’s approach to marijuana, however, has not mirrored that of the states. As noted above, the Department of Justice under
275

Obama, supra note 269.
Dickinson, supra note 24.
ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 49–51.
278
NORML, http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/E3K2-Q5R2].
279
Quinnipiac University Poll supra note 216 (finding that fifty-nine percent of respondents supported legalizing marijuana in the United States).
280
Id. (showing that ninety-three percent of survey respondents supported legalized marijuana for medical purposes if prescribed by a doctor).
281
Dickinson, supra note 24.
282
Ingraham, supra note 217.
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President Obama declined in most cases to use federal law to prosecute
state-licensed growers and retailers of marijuana283 and noted tacit acceptance of legalization efforts at the state level.284 However, marijuana remains
listed as a Schedule I drug under federal scheduling, equivalent to heroin and
other “drugs with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for
abuse.”285 Moreover, the federal criminal and sentencing laws addressing
marijuana remain unchanged; federal laws prohibiting the cultivation and
distribution of marijuana remain in effect, which means that the recent
change in administration or Justice Department policies could chill states’
efforts toward legalization.286 At the very least it could create a conflict in
national approaches and confusion regarding the status of medical and recreational marijuana use at the state level if federal enforcement practices
change.
Despite the federal government’s conflicting approach, the decriminalization and legalization at the state level will likely continue for the reasons
noted above. The question, however, is whether the changing views on marijuana will translate into efforts to decriminalize and legalize other substances. Changing perceptions of drug use and drug offenders has already
resulted in shifting the possession of controlled substances from felonies to
misdemeanors and the decriminalization of possession of small quantities of
controlled substances (not just marijuana) in several states. Thus, states seem
to be moving toward a sentencing scheme in which prison is reserved for
only the most serious drug offenses—those involving very large quantities
of drugs or violence. This signifies a marked change in the war on drugs and
one that could be embraced by both fiscally conservative policymakers and
liberal reformers.
CONCLUSION
The past fifteen years have witnessed a remarkable change in the U.S.
war on drugs. After thirty years of increasingly harsh enforcement and sentencing policies directed as both sellers and users of drugs, policymakers
have begun to repeal many of the most draconian drug policies and to rethink approaches to the least dangerous drug offenders—repealing
mandatory sentences, creating mandatory probation and treatment sentences,
and decriminalizing or legalizing simple possession. These changes, however, have been reserved largely to the states.
If the states are any indication, there is clear public and some policymaker support to move beyond the war on drugs and to adopt a medical,
treatment-based approach to drug use consistent with most Western democracies. Although drug courts and diversion are not new tools, states are ex283

Cole Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3.
Remnick, supra note 213.
285
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
286
Berenson, supra note 215.
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panding eligibility requirements for drug courts and diversion to include a
wider range of individuals not even charged with a drug offense. In other
words, many states are seeking to change their sentencing practices regarding property offenses or other non-violent offenses when individuals have a
documented substance abuse problem. The result is an embrace of treatment
rather than criminalization as a more appropriate response to substance
abuse and a recognition by the system of the underlying causes of criminality. This puts states on the path not just to dismantle the war on drugs, but
potentially to address the problem of mass incarceration. Dismantling the
war on drugs, however, is no small feat. The sentencing policies and practices established under the war on drugs took thirty years to create and require political will to alter. Moreover, the apparatus for enforcing the war on
drugs is entrenched in the criminal justice system and includes sunk costs in
law enforcement, courts, jails, and prisons to apprehend, process, and house
large numbers of drug offenders. Nonetheless, the movement at the state
level is significant and marks a clear shift in policy.
Although the rhetoric around drug offenses was moderated at the federal level under the Obama administration, harsh federal drug policies
passed in the 1980s and 1990s remain largely intact, and now often conflict
with the policies of many states. As the opioid epidemic continues unabated,
the changing face of drug use and addiction may, in turn, change federal
approaches to drug enforcement. However, there is little indication that the
Trump administration or Congress has drug reforms or criminal justice reform as priorities. In fact, the new Trump administration has called for a
return to law and order policies, aggressive policing tactics, and a focus on
inner-city violence. These factors do not bode well for federal reforms
around drugs or criminal justice. Given the rhetorical change from the previous administration and the influence of federal funding on local law enforcement, this may also create problems for state and local policymakers. The
sweeping policy reforms across the states and the changes in public perception about drugs, however, have created a significant buffer that will likely
insulate jurisdictions as they seek to further dismantle the war on drugs.

